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“The idea of children having rights is, in many ways,
a revolutionary one.” 1
INTRODUCTION
For almost two centuries, children were largely absent
from the class of constitutional rights-holders. It was not until
the 1932 decision in Powell v. Alabama that the Supreme Court
† Evangeline Starr Professor of Law, University of Connecticut School
of Law. B.A. Yale College; J.D. Harvard Law School. Susan Appleton, Steven
Ecker, Peter Siegelman, and participants at the University of Connecticut
School of Law’s faculty workshop series provided very helpful comments on
earlier versions of this Article. Thanks to Claire Pavlovic, Amelia Rawls, and
Ashley Schaefer for excellent research assistance. Copyright © 2011 by Anne
C. Dailey.
1. Michael S. Wald, Children’s Rights: A Framework for Analysis, 12
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 255, 256 (1979).
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expressly held that children have constitutional rights.2 The
fact that the Supreme Court decided no children’s rights cases
before 1932 does not mean that children possessed no constitutional rights. Even if their rights were not litigated, children
clearly had certain fundamental constitutional rights such as a
Thirteenth Amendment right not to be enslaved and rights under the Due Process Clause not to be deprived arbitrarily of life
or liberty. Yet the inferred existence of some fundamental
rights for children does not negate the fact that, well into the
twentieth century, children enjoyed—at best—only a minimal
set of constitutional entitlements.
This long history of denying children the full range of constitutional rights has roots in a choice theory of rights. Choice
theory understands rights as deriving from the decisionmaking
autonomy of the individual.3 From the perspective of choice
2. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 50, 57–58 (1932) (holding that “young,
ignorant” defendants were denied due process of law under the Fourteenth
Amendment).
3. See, e.g., Jeremy Waldron, Introduction to THEORIES OF RIGHTS 1, 9
(Jeremy Waldron ed., 1984). Choice theory is sometimes referred to as the
agency or will theory of rights. Many authors have discussed choice theory as
applied to children. See, e.g., DAVID ARCHARD, CHILDREN: RIGHTS AND
CHILDHOOD 54 (2004) [hereinafter ARCHARD, RIGHTS AND CHILDHOOD] (“If, as
many will argue, children are incapable of exercising choice then, according to
the will theory at least, they do not have rights.”); JAMES G. DWYER, THE
RELATIONSHIP RIGHTS OF CHILDREN 291–92 (2006) (discussing the implications of the will theory of rights for children); David Archard & Colin M. Macleod, Introduction to THE MORAL AND POLITICAL STATUS OF CHILDREN 1, 5
(2002) (noting that advocates of choice theory view “[t]he primary and appropriate functions of rights [as] the recognition and protection of the person qua
autonomous agent”); Tom D. Campbell, The Rights of the Minor: As Person, As
Juvenile, As Future Adult, 6 INT’L J.L. & FAM. 1, 2 (1992) (discussing the implications of the will theory of rights for children); Neil MacCormick, Children’s Rights: A Test-Case for Theories of Right, in LEGAL RIGHT AND SOCIAL
DEMOCRACY 154, 156 (1982) (noting that the will theory of rights “suggests
that what is common to all types of right is that they make the choice, or the
will, of the right-holder paramount in a given relationship”).
Some of the major legal works on children’s rights present choice theory in
the process of critiquing it. See, e.g., BARBARA BENNETT WOODHOUSE, HIDDEN
IN PLAIN SIGHT: THE TRAGEDY OF CHILDREN’S RIGHTS FROM BEN FRANKLIN TO
LIONEL TATE (2008) [hereinafter WOODHOUSE, HIDDEN IN PLAIN SIGHT]; Bruce
C. Hafen, Children’s Liberation and the New Egalitarianism: Some Reservations About Abandoning Youth to Their “Rights,” 1976 BYU L. REV. 605, 610–
13; Martha Minow, Rights for the Next Generation: A Feminist Approach to
Children’s Rights, 9 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 1, 1–3 (1986) [hereinafter Minow,
Rights for the Next Generation]; Martha Minow, What Ever Happened to
Children’s Rights?, 80 MINN. L. REV. 267, 268–78 (1995) [hereinafter Minow,
What Ever Happened to Children’s Rights?]; Lee E. Teitelbaum, Children’s
Rights and the Problem of Equal Respect, 27 HOFSTRA L. REV. 799, 801–04
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theory, children do not enjoy most constitutional rights because
they lack the capacity for autonomous choice.4 The theory that
children do not possess adult rights because they lack autonomous decisionmaking skills is reinforced by the existence of a
robust constitutional doctrine of parental rights. Since the early 1920s, parents have enjoyed broad constitutional rights to
the care and custody of their children. Parents possess decisionmaking authority because, as the Supreme Court has observed, children are not yet “fully rational, choosing agent[s].”5
The Court’s enthusiastic recognition of parental rights fortifies
the view that individuals below the age of majority lack the
state of mind required of constitutional rights-holders.
Choice theory not only justifies the long history of denying
children rights, but also serves to explain the recent but growing number of modern Supreme Court cases in which children’s
constitutional rights have been recognized. Choice theory regards these newly recognized rights as “autonomy rights,” that
is, adult rights given to older children based on their increasing
(1999) [hereinafter Teitelbaum, Children’s Rights]; Lee E. Teitelbaum, Foreword: The Meanings of Rights of Children, 10 N.M. L. REV. 235, 242–52 (1979)
[hereinafter Teitelbaum, Foreword ]; Wald, supra note 1, at 257–58; Barbara
Bennett Woodhouse, “Out of Children’s Needs, Children’s Rights”: The Child’s
Voice in Defining the Family, 8 BYU J. PUB. L. 321, 322 (1993).
4. See, e.g., ARCHARD, RIGHTS AND CHILDHOOD, supra note 3, at 93 (“On
the standard liberal account, children lack rational autonomy.”); David Archard, Free Speech and Children’s Interests, 79 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 83, 91–93
(2004) [hereinafter Archard, Free Speech] (“A child incapable of exercising
choice is reasonably disqualified from having liberty rights.”); Archard & Macleod, supra note 3, at 5 (“Since children, at least infants, lack the capacities
requisite for autonomy on which the very concept of a right is allegedly predicated, it makes no sense, however well-intentioned this might be, to ascribe
rights to children.”); Emily Buss, Constitutional Fidelity Through Children’s
Rights, 2004 SUP. CT. REV. 355, 358–59 (“The capacity whose relevance to
children’s exercise of rights is most commonly noted is the capacity for logical
thinking.”); Campbell, supra note 3, at 5 (noting that under choice theory,
“[m]inors can have rights only to the extent that they have acquired adult-like
capacities for reasoned decisionmaking and willed conduct under the control of
rational moral agency”); Katherine Hunt Federle, On the Road to Reconceiving
Rights for Children: A Postfeminist Analysis of the Capacity Principle, 42
DEPAUL L. REV. 983, 985 (1993) (“[W]hen discussing the concept of children’s
rights, the debate invariably returns to the capacity of children.”); Hafen, supra note 3, at 613 (“The presumption of minors’ incapacity has been so strong
that the growth of democratic ideals in American society, rather than encouraging the ‘liberation’ of children from limitations upon their liberty, has encouraged even greater discrimination on the basis of age . . . .”).
5. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 825 n.23 (1988); see also Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979) (“The law’s concept of the family rests on
a presumption that parents possess what a child lacks in maturity, experience,
and capacity for judgment required for making life’s difficult decisions.”).
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capacity for autonomous choice. Because they are understood to
reflect older children’s decisionmaking skills, autonomy rights
reinforce rather than undermine the broader framework of
choice theory. The seminal cases in this view are Tinker v. Des
Moines Independent Community School District and In re
Gault, which held that older children have adult constitutional
rights for purposes of speech in school and juvenile proceedings,
respectively.6 Because choice theory focuses on the point at
which children will be treated as adults for constitutional purposes, it modifies but does not reject outright the traditional
choice thesis. For children deemed too immature to make decisions on their own behalf, the traditional choice thesis—which
posits no rights for children and broad parental authority—still
applies.
This Article argues that the prevailing choice theory falls
short as a theory of children’s constitutional rights for two reasons. First, as a descriptive matter, choice theory is simply too
narrow to serve as a general theory of children’s constitutional
rights. As choice theorists would acknowledge, the theory does
not address whole categories of existing rights where the decisionmaking autonomy of the right-holder is not at issue. For
example, choice theory does not account for the long line of
education cases, beginning with Brown v. Board of Education,7
that do not turn on children’s autonomy skills but rest on children’s special status as developing citizens. But even with respect to that set of “autonomy rights” most closely associated
with choice theory, such as students’ right to free speech in
school, the paradigm still falls short. A review of Supreme
Court cases reveals that many if not most modern autonomy
rights function not to emancipate mature children from the authority of parents and the state but instead to protect or socialize immature children into becoming autonomous adults. Although the Supreme Court and commentators frequently
utilize the language of choice theory, a close examination of the
modern autonomy rights cases reveals the Court’s deep ambiv6. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506
(1969); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 78 (1967); see also, e.g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S.
565, 574 (1975); Minow, What Ever Happened to Children’s Rights?, supra
note 3, at 275 (citing In re Gault, Goss, and Tinker as the first liberationist
cases); Teitelbaum, Children’s Rights, supra note 3, at 810–12 (identifying In
re Gault and Tinker as foundational cases in children’s rights jurisprudence);
Wald, supra note 1, at 266 (identifying In re Gault, Goss, and Tinker as the
first autonomy rights cases).
7. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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alence over the idea of children as mature decisionmakers. Prevailing choice theory thus fails to provide an adequate descriptive account of most existing constitutional rights for children,
one that recognizes their important function in socializing
children into becoming autonomous adults. More broadly,
choice theory has no conceptual apparatus for defining children’s rights in terms of children’s future autonomy or for conceiving of children’s rights in socializing terms.
Second, as a psychology of decisionmaking, choice theory
rests on an excessively rationalist model of decisionmaking that
ignores numerous core aspects of mature, autonomous choice.
Any approach to children’s rights premised on children’s existing or future decisionmaking capacity requires an underlying
psychological theory that explains why children either lack or
possess essential autonomy skills. Under choice theory, the
quality of mind most frequently identified as missing in children is the capacity for cognitive, rational thought. But while
cognitive skills are clearly important to autonomous decisionmaking, choice theory overemphasizes rationality at the expense of other, equally important attributes of choice. Psychological research on decisionmaking illuminates the broad range
of mental skills—cognitive, emotional, and imaginative—that
children must acquire in order to become autonomous decisionmakers. By associating autonomous choice with criticalthinking skills learned in school, choice theory ignores the noncognitive attributes of choice and the family caregiving essential to their development. The theory’s cognitive bias reinforces
a constitutional jurisprudence that overlooks the important role
that early caregiving plays in the socialization process leading
to adult autonomy.
This Article presents a developmental theory of children’s
constitutional rights that overcomes the descriptive and psychological limitations of the prevailing choice theory while preserving its central commitment to the constitutional value of
individual autonomy. The developmental theory views rights as
serving first and foremost to foster the social conditions under
which children are most likely to develop the skills of adult autonomy. The theory proposes a class of “developmental rights”
that operate to secure children’s future autonomy by promoting
their socialization into autonomous adults. The paradigm of
developmental rights, it is argued, better describes children’s
existing constitutional rights and provides a more robust normative framework for thinking about what rights children
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should or should not have. This Article further argues that the
concept of children’s future autonomy must be informed by contemporary psychological understandings of choice. Drawing
from research on decisionmaking, this Article identifies the
specific mental attributes of cognition, emotion, and imagination that make autonomous choice possible. The essential insight here is that early family relationships are critical to the
development of the skills necessary for adult autonomy. This
Article utilizes findings from developmental psychology to show
the extent to which family caregiving plays an essential role,
along with school, in promoting the cognitive and noncognitive
skills of autonomous choice.8
The developmental theory’s core insight into the importance of caregiving to children’s future autonomy supports recognizing children’s fundamental constitutional rights in the
caregiving relationship. As described in this Article, children’s
caregiving rights take three basic forms. First are children’s
rights under the Due Process Clause to be free from state intervention into established caregiving relationships. Second are
children’s rights arising under other constitutional provisions
where the rights at issue touch upon their caregiving interests.
Third, and most far-reaching, are children’s affirmative constitutional rights to a minimum level of caregiving services from
the state. This final category of rights focuses the debate on
state support for the caregiving relationships children need to
become autonomous adults and citizens. While the proposal
raises unavoidable questions regarding the judiciary’s role in
defining and enforcing children’s affirmative constitutional
rights, at the very least the developmental theory draws attention to the question of the nature and scope of governmental
duties to provide children with essential caregiving services necessary for their development into autonomous adults and citizens.

8. This theory of the close developmental connection between family caregiving and the skills of public life relates to John Rawls’s argument in A
Theory of Justice that early parental love is the developmental beginning for
acquiring a sense of justice. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 405–09
(rev. ed. 1999); see also BRUCE ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL
STATE 140–50 (1980); Anne L. Alstott, Is the Family at Odds with Equality?
The Legal Implications of Equality for Children, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 6–10
(2008). In addition to Alstott, other feminists have asserted the deep interconnection between the virtues of caregiving and the liberal value of autonomy.
See, e.g., Jennifer Nedelsky, Reconceiving Autonomy: Sources, Thoughts and
Possibilities, 1 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 7, 12 (1989).
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The developmental theory should not be misinterpreted as
opening the door to unfettered state control over children’s lives
in the name of their proper socialization into good citizens. Any
objection along these lines is misguided. Numerous Supreme
Court decisions already recognize the state’s role in children’s
socialization, most notably in the area of education.9 The state
has long employed its parens patriae power to require that students attend school, to regulate their labor, to compel vaccinations, to impose curfews, and a host of other laws. While the
developmental theory broadens the state’s sphere of legitimate
interest to include caregiving, this interest does not give the
state carte blanche to override the family’s fundamental right
of privacy, the parents’ right to the care and custody of their
children, or children’s own developmental rights to relationships with their primary caregivers. As in any constitutional
context, the importance of the state interests must be balanced
against the particular constitutional rights at stake. Thus, although constitutional recognition of children’s caregiving interests would expand state power under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, this power is neither new nor unlimited.
Evaluating the extent to which state action directed to supporting children’s caregiving interests intrudes on their future autonomy interests will not always be easy. But the potential difficulty of the constitutional inquiry—and the risk that some
state overreaching will occur—should not be an obstacle to recognizing the state’s legitimate constitutional power and duty to
protect children’s caregiving interests.
More importantly, failing to recognize the state’s responsibility to provide the conditions for children’s future well-being
simply leaves millions of children vulnerable to the long-term
adverse effects of wealth inequality in the United States. The
state’s failure to provide support for children’s caregiving has
serious adverse consequences for disadvantaged children, particularly for the nearly twenty percent of children who live in
poverty in the United States.10 Systemic and chronic failure in
early caregiving due to childhood poverty is a harm of overriding importance from a developmental point of view. As de9. See, e.g., Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506; Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S.
510, 536 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 403 (1923).
10. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, INCOME, POVERTY, AND HEALTH
INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE UNITED STATES: 2007, 12 (2008), available at
http://www.census.gov/prod/2008pubs/p60-235.pdf (showing eighteen percent of
all persons under age eighteen living in poverty in 2007).
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scribed in Part II of this Article, developmental rights to caregiving will necessarily bring about significant public investment in early childcare for the most disadvantaged children.
The developmental theory explains why children at risk for
caregiving failure possess these affirmative rights to caregiving
services as future members of the constitutional polity.
I. THE CHOICE THEORY OF CHILDREN’S RIGHTS
Choice theory informs Supreme Court decisions relating to
children as well as debates over children’s rights in the legal
literature. Section A describes choice theory’s traditional thesis,
which justifies the denial of children’s rights based on children’s impaired capacity for autonomous choice. This section
then outlines the theory of children’s socialization that underlies choice theory and in particular the Supreme Court’s broad
protection for parental rights and state parens patriae power.
Section B describes the emergence of children’s “autonomy”
rights in constitutional law beginning in the 1960s. The Court’s
modern decisions recognizing children’s autonomy rights are
generally understood to reflect the idea that older adolescents
possess mature decisionmaking capacities in certain contexts.
However, as explained here, many of these cases actually rest
on the presumption of children’s immature decisionmaking
skills and function to protect and socialize children rather than
to emancipate them. Section C then explains why the descriptive and psychological limitations of choice theory render it an
inadequate framework for understanding and conceptualizing
children’s constitutional rights.
A. THE TRADITIONAL THESIS
1. Impaired Choice
The prevailing choice theory posits that children lack certain rights accorded to adults because they lack the capacity for
autonomous decisionmaking necessary for the exercise of those
very rights.11 With respect to older children especially, who can
otherwise function independently, the core missing attribute is
the capacity of self-determination.12 Choice theory views deci11. See sources cited supra note 4; see also Campbell, supra note 3, at 2
(“[T]he distinctive thing about children’s rights [under choice theory] is that
there are none.”).
12. John S. Mill’s work illustrates the classic view on autonomy. See JOHN
S. MILL, On Liberty, in ON LIBERTY AND OTHER ESSAYS 5, 14 (John Gray ed.,
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sionmaking autonomy as a precondition for the exercise of
many of the most important rights in a liberal state, including
the rights to vote, to freedom of speech and association, and to
personal liberty in matters relating to marriage, reproduction,
and childrearing.13 The traditional choice thesis allows the
state to discriminate against children in almost every area of
social life.14 This idea that children lack autonomy and therefore any claim to rights of their own has a distinguished pedigree. As John Stuart Mill observed,

Oxford Univ. Press 1991) (1859) (“The only part of the conduct of any one, for
which he is amenable to society, is that which concerns others. In the part
which merely concerns himself, his independence is, of right, absolute. Over
himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign.”). The literature on autonomy is vast. See, e.g., STEPHEN MACEDO, LIBERAL VIRTUES: A
LIBERAL THEORY OF CITIZENSHIP, VIRTUE, AND COMMUNITY 262 (1987) (defining autonomy in terms of “the development of the capacity critically to assess
and even actively shape not simply one’s actions, but one’s character itself ”);
JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 369 (1986) (“The ideal of personal
autonomy is the vision of people controlling, to some degree, their own destiny,
fashioning it through successive decisions throughout their lives.”); Richard H.
Fallon, Jr., Two Senses of Autonomy, 46 STAN. L. REV. 875, 877 (1994) (“To be
autonomous, one must be able to form a conception of the good, deliberate rationally, and act consistently with one’s goals.”); Nedelsky, supra note 8, at 8
(“The image of humans as self-determining creatures . . . remains one of the
most powerful dimensions of liberal thought.”).
13. See Hafen, supra note 3, at 650 (“The presumptions arising from the
limited capacities of minors account in large part for the general limitation on
their exercise of rights that are in the ‘choice’ category, because the law assumes . . . that a basic capacity to make responsible choices is a prerequisite to
the meaningful exercise of choice rights.”); see also Fallon, supra note 12, at
876 n.2 (“Autonomy has been identified as a value underlying the constitutional protection of privacy, procedural due process, equal protection, and free
exercise rights.”); John H. Garvey, Freedom and Choice in Constitutional Law,
94 HARV. L. REV. 1756, 1761 (1981) (justifying age-based restrictions on voting
“[s]ince ultimately the ballot functions as a means of self-government, an activity difficult for those incapable of moral and rational choice”).
14. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005) (“In recognition of the
comparative immaturity and irresponsibility of juveniles, almost every State
prohibits those under 18 years of age from voting, serving on juries, or marrying without parental consent.”); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 823–24
(1988) (noting that minors in Oklahoma are “[n]ot eligible to vote, to sit on a
jury, to marry without parental consent, or to purchase alcohol or cigarettes”
(citations omitted)); id. at 853–54 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“Legislatures
recognize the relative immaturity of adolescents, and we have often permitted
them to define age-based classes that take account of this qualitative difference between juveniles and adults.”); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 591 (1975)
(Powell, J., dissenting) (“Examples of this distinction [between adults and
children] abound in our law: in contracts, in torts, in criminal law and procedure, in criminal sanctions and rehabilitation, and in the right to vote and
hold office.”).
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It is perhaps hardly necessary to say that this doctrine [of individual
liberty] is meant to apply only to human beings in the maturity of
their faculties. We are not speaking of children, or of young persons
below the age which the law may fix as that of manhood or womanhood.15

The Supreme Court has expressed a version of this traditional choice thesis in many cases over the past few decades.16
In 1979, Chief Justice Burger, speaking for a unanimous Court,
observed that “the law’s concept of the family rests on a presumption that parents possess what a child lacks in maturity,
experience, and capacity for judgment required for making life’s
difficult decisions.”17 A decade earlier, in Ginsberg v. New York,
the Court upheld a state law prohibiting the sale of pornography to minors on the ground that “a child may not be as well
prepared as an adult to make an intelligent choice as to the
material he chooses to read.”18 Justice Stewart wrote in concurrence:
[At] least in some precisely delineated areas, a child—like someone in
a captive audience—is not possessed of that full capacity for individual choice which is the presupposition of First Amendment guarantees.
It is only upon such a premise, I should suppose, that a State may deprive children of other rights—the right to marry, for example, or the
right to vote—deprivations that would be constitutionally intolerable
for adults.19

In Bellotti v. Baird, the Court recognized the right of mature adolescent girls to choose whether to terminate a pregnancy, while nevertheless expressing “concern over the inability of
children to make mature choices.”20 As the Court emphasized,
“during the formative years of childhood and adolescence, mi15. Mill, supra note 12, at 14; see also RAWLS, supra note 8, at 183 (describing paternalism as the responsibility to “[c]hoose for others as we have
reason to believe they would choose for themselves if they were at the age of
reason and deciding rationally”); JOHN LOCKE, The Second Treatise of Government, in TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 399, § 170 (Peter Laslett ed.,
1960) (“Paternal or Parental Power is nothing but that, which Parents have
over their Children, to govern them for the Childrens [sic] good, till they come
to the use of Reason . . . .”).
16. The Supreme Court has declined to provide a general theory of children’s rights on at least two occasions. See Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S.
629, 636 (1968) (“We have no occasion in this case to consider the impact of the
guarantees of freedom of expression upon the totality of the relationship of the
minor and the state.”); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13 (1967) (“We do not in this
opinion consider the impact of these constitutional provisions upon the totality
of the relationship of the juvenile and the state.”).
17. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 601, 602 (1979).
18. Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 642 n.10.
19. Id. at 649–50 (Stewart, J., concurring).
20. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 636 (1979) (plurality opinion).
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nors often lack the experience, perspective, and judgment to
recognize and avoid choices that could be detrimental to
them.”21 Accordingly, “the State has considerable latitude in
enacting laws affecting minors on the basis of their lesser capacity for mature, affirmative choice.”22 And in striking down
the death penalty for individuals who were minors at the time
of their crime, the Supreme Court observed:
[A]s any parent knows and as the scientific and sociological studies
respondent and his amici cite tend to confirm, a lack of maturity and
an underdeveloped sense of responsibility are found in youth more often than in adults and are more understandable among the young.
These qualities often result in impetuous and ill-considered actions
and decisions.23

While the traditional choice thesis is self-evident with regard to younger children, the Supreme Court has been explicit
that it applies to older children as well. The Court asserted in
Parham v. J.R. that “[m]ost children, even in adolescence,
simply are not able to make sound judgments concerning many
decisions.”24 In death penalty cases involving older children,
the Court has recognized “[minors’] inherent difference from
adults in their capacity as agents, as choosers, as shapers of
their own lives.”25 In the Court’s view, even these older children
are not yet “fully rational, choosing agent[s].”26 The dependency
thesis is thus reflected in a long line of cases questioning the
autonomous decisionmaking power of children. Again and
again, the Court has emphasized that, in Justice Stewart’s
words, the child “is not possessed of that full capacity for individual choice.”27
The Court has on several occasions identified with greater
specificity the two psychological features that render children’s
choices unreliable for purposes of constitutional law: vulnera21. Id. at 635.
22. Id. at 637 n.15.
23. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005) (internal citations omitted).
24. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 603 (1979); see also Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 834 (1988) (“[A]dolescents as a class are less mature and
responsible than adults.”); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115 n.11
(1982) (“[A]dolescents may have less capacity to control their conduct and to
think in long-range terms than adults.” (internal citations omitted)); id. at 116
(“Particularly ‘during the formative years of childhood and adolescence, minors often lack the experience, perspective, and judgment’ expected of adults.”
(quoting Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 635)).
25. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 825 n.23.
26. Id.
27. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 649–50 (1968) (Stewart, J.,
concurring).
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bility to outside coercion and an innately impaired capacity for
rational decisionmaking. In Roper v. Simmons, a majority of
the Court, in an opinion by Justice Kennedy, stressed the two
factors of vulnerability to coercion and impaired rational decisionmaking skills.28 Similarly, in Bellotti, a plurality of the
Court, in an opinion by Justice Powell, reiterated that children
exhibit a vulnerability to outside influences and an “inability to
make critical decisions in an informed, mature manner.”29 The
Court in Thompson v. Oklahoma came to the same conclusion.30
The fact that children are more vulnerable to psychological
persuasion than adults often surfaces in cases involving children’s coerced confessions or speech directed at children.31 In
the Supreme Court’s view, a child under interrogation or in
school is positioned like “someone in a captive audience.”32 In
contrast, the point that children have impaired rational
choice—that is, that they lack innate decisionmaking skills—is
28. The Court added a third factor in the particular context of the death
penalty: “[T]he character of a juvenile is not as well formed as that of an
adult.” Roper, 543 U.S. at 570 (citing generally E. ERIKSON, IDENTITY: YOUTH
AND CRISIS (1968)).
29. Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 634. Here again, the plurality identified a third
factor specific to the particular context of parental consent laws: “the importance of the parental role in child rearing.” Id.
30. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 816. Extensively citing developmental research
in the area of adolescent decisionmaking, the Court in Thompson emphasized
that “[i]nexperience, less education, and less intelligence make the teenager
less able to evaluate the consequences of his or her conduct while at the same
time he or she is much more apt to be motivated by mere emotion or peer
pressure than is an adult.” Id. The Court observed that “[t]he difference that
separates children from adults for most purposes of the law is children’s immature, undeveloped ability to reason in an adultlike manner.” Id. at 835 n.43
(citing VICTOR STREIB, DEATH PENALTY FOR JUVENILES 184 –89 (1987)).
31. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 592 (1992) (“[T]here are heightened
concerns with protecting freedom of conscience from subtle coercive pressure
in the elementary and secondary public schools.”); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455
U.S. 104, 115 (1982) (“[Youth] is a time and condition of life when a person
may be most susceptible to influence and to psychological damage.”); Ginsberg,
390 U.S. at 642 n.10 (citing to materials describing pornography’s “potent influence on the developing ego”); Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49, 53–54
(1962) (holding that a fourteen-year-old boy “cannot be compared with an
adult in full possession of his senses and knowledgeable of the consequences of
his admissions”); Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 601 (1948) (holding that “on the
facts of [the] record,” a fifteen-year-old had no “freedom of choice”); see also
Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 729 (1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (evaluating the potential for coerciveness in the custodial interrogation of a juvenile under investigation).
32. Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 649.
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present either explicitly or implicitly in almost all cases involving children’s rights.33 According to the plurality in Bellotti, the
specific decisionmaking attributes missing in children are “experience, perspective, and judgment to recognize and avoid
choices that could be detrimental to them.”34 That same year,
in Parham, a unanimous Court repeated that lack of “maturity,
experience, and capacity for judgment” is what impairs children’s innate capacity for autonomous choice.35 The Supreme
Court’s assumption of children’s impaired choice is reinforced
by the correlative constitutional doctrine of parental rights. In
case after case, the Supreme Court has afforded parents the
constitutional right “to direct the upbringing and education of
children under their control.”36 Indeed, as the Supreme Court
has recently observed, “[T]he interest of parents in the care,
custody, and control of their children . . . is perhaps the oldest
of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by this Court.”37
First applied in a pair of cases from the 1920s, the doctrine of
parental rights under the Due Process Clause expresses and
reinforces the dependency view of children’s rights by establishing parental decisionmaking authority over children.38 As the
Supreme Court observed in Prince v. Massachusetts, “It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom
include preparation for obligations the state can neither supply
33. See infra Part I.B.
34. Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 635.
35. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979).
36. Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534 –35 (1925); see also Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 758–59 (1982) (noting that a natural parent’s
right to care for his or her children is an “interest far more precious than any
property right”); Parham, 442 U.S. at 602 (“Our jurisprudence historically has
reflected Western civilization concepts of the family as a unit with broad parental authority over minor children.”); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255
(1978) (“We have recognized on numerous occasions that the relationship between parent and child is constitutionally protected.”); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406
U.S. 205, 232 (1972) (“The history and culture of Western civilization reflect a
strong tradition of parental concern for the nurture and upbringing of their
children.”); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972) (identifying that the
private “interest of a parent in the companionship, care, custody, and management of his or her children” warrants deference); Prince v. Massachusetts,
321 U.S. 158, 165 (1944) (recognizing a “parent’s claim to authority in her own
household and in the rearing of her children”); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S.
390, 399 (1923) (including within an adult’s due process liberties the right to
“establish a home and bring up children”).
37. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000).
38. Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534; Meyer, 262 U.S. at 401.
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nor hinder.”39 In Parham, the Court further emphasized that
parental authority derives from a presumption that parents
possess what children lack in decisionmaking skills.40 As the
plurality in Thompson expressed it: “[P]aternalism bears a beneficent face, paternalism in the sense of a caring, nurturing
parent making decisions on behalf of a child who is not quite
ready to take on the fully rational and considered task of shaping his or her own life.”41
Of course, parental rights are not absolute. The state has
the parens patriae authority to intercede in the lives of children
in order to protect their safety, to promote their education, or
otherwise to further their best interests.42 The Court in Prince
explained: “Acting to guard the general interest in youth’s well
being, the state as parens patriae may restrict the parent’s control by requiring school attendance, regulating or prohibiting
the child’s labor, and in many other ways.”43 The state power to
intervene as a benevolent parent in the life of the child has given rise to laws establishing the modern juvenile court system
and the system of universal public education.44 But state parens patriae authority does not lead to children having rights of
their own. As the Supreme Court observed in In re Gault, “[t]he
Latin phrase proved to be a great help to those who sought to
39. Prince, 321 U.S. at 166; see also Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629,
639 (1968) (“[C]onstitutional interpretation has consistently recognized that
the parents’ claim to authority in their own household to direct the rearing of
their children is basic in the structure of our society.”).
40. Parham, 442 U.S. at 602 (“The law’s concept of the family rests on a
presumption that parents possess what a child lacks in maturity, experience,
and capacity for judgment required for making life’s difficult decisions.”).
41. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 825 n.23 (1988).
42. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 766 (1982) (noting that the
state has “a parens patriae interest in preserving and promoting the welfare of
the child”).
43. Prince, 321 U.S. at 166 (citations omitted). As the Court stated, “Parents may be free to become martyrs themselves. But it does not follow that
they are free, in identical circumstances, to make martyrs of their children before they have reached the age of full and legal discretion when they can make
that choice for themselves.” Id. at 170.
44. See Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 263 (1984) (observing that a state’s
parens patriae interest in the welfare of a child makes “juvenile proceeding[s]
fundamentally different from an adult criminal trial”); Kent v. U.S., 383 U.S.
541, 554 –55 (1966) (noting that “[t]he State is parens patriae rather than
prosecuting attorney or judge” in the juvenile justice system); Hafen, supra
note 3, at 613 (“The juvenile court movement and the expansion of compulsory
public education are obvious examples of the way American democratization
has reflected the views of Locke and Mill about protecting and developing the
capacities of the young.”).
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rationalize the exclusion of juveniles from the constitutional
scheme.”45 In other words, parental rights and state parens patriae authority together operate to reinforce and justify the paternalistic treatment of children as less than full constitutional
rights-holders.
2. Children’s Socialization
Under choice theory, adult individuals are presumed to
have the capacity for autonomous choice absent mental incapacity or incompetence.46 But the presumption of autonomous
choice has not blinded commentators and courts to the fact that
this capacity is an acquired skill.47 Theorists have long acknowledged the obvious fact that the capacity for autonomous
choice develops over time.48 Children are born into a state of
physical and emotional dependence, and—if all goes well—
slowly acquire the skills for leading an independent, autonomous life.49 Moreover, this developmental process has traditionally been understood as one of learning rather than innate
psychological growth.50 As reflected in the rise of universal pub45. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 16 (1967).
46. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
47. See Prince, 321 U.S. at 165 (“It is the interest of youth itself, and of
the whole community, that children be both safeguarded from abuses and given opportunities for growth into free and independent well-developed men and
citizens.”); ACKERMAN, supra note 8, at 139–67 (discussing the importance of a
liberal education); JEFFREY BLUSTEIN, PARENTS AND CHILDREN: THE ETHICS
OF THE FAMILY 131 (1982) (“[A]utonomy must be developed and fostered by
particular psychological and educational circumstances from very early on in
childhood.”); JEAN BETHKE ELSHTAIN, The Family and Civic Life, in POWER
TRIPS AND OTHER JOURNEYS: ESSAYS IN FEMINISM AS CIVIC DISCOURSE 45, 49
(1990) (“Liberal and democratic citizenship required the creation of persons
with qualities of mind and spirit necessary for civic participation. This creation of citizens was seen as neither simple nor automatic by early liberal
theorists . . . .”).
48. See supra note 47.
49. See id.
50. John Locke, for example, posited that children’s inchoate powers of
reason must be nurtured. See LOCKE, supra note 15. John Stuart Mill also
emphasized education as a central component of a liberal upbringing. MILL,
supra note 12, at 116–17 (“[I]t is one of the most sacred duties of the parents
. . . to give to that being an education fitting him to perform his part well in
life towards others and towards himself.”). John Dewey and other progressive
reformers emphasized the importance of education to the developing needs of
children and the long-term health of the democratic polity. See Anne C. Dailey,
Developing Citizens, 91 IOWA L. REV. 431, 440 (2006) (discussing reformers’
commitment as “part of a broader progressive-era movement for democracy
that rested on a belief in the importance of educating children for democratic
citizenship”); see also JAMES T. KLOPPENBERG, UNCERTAIN VICTORY: SOCIAL
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lic education in the early twentieth century, the idea that all
children can and must acquire the psychological skills for participation in the broader liberal society through learning has
been widely accepted.51
Modern constitutional law impliedly draws on this longstanding tradition of thinking about what needs to happen for
children to become autonomous, rights-bearing individuals. As
already discussed, “[t]he law’s concept of the family rests on a
presumption that parents possess what a child lacks in maturity, experience, and capacity for judgment required for making
life’s difficult decisions.”52 But in addition to their role as surrogate decisionmakers, parents also serve an essential socializing function.53 The constitutional doctrine of parental rights reflects in part the view that an upbringing for autonomous
choice requires, in the first instance, a loving home in which
parents have the authority and duty to foster values in their
children.54 In Pierce v. Society of Sisters, for example, the Court
DEMOCRACY AND PROGRESSIVISM IN EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN THOUGHT,
1870–1920, at 377 (1986); ARTHUR S. LINK & RICHARD L. MCCORMICK,
PROGRESSIVISM 90 (1983).
51. See Hafen, supra note 3, at 613 (“The juvenile court movement and
the expansion of compulsory public education are obvious examples of the way
American democratization has reflected the views of Locke and Mill about protecting and developing the capacities of the young.”).
52. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979).
53. See ACKERMAN, supra note 8, at 140–43 (discussing the role of the
family in preparing the child cognitively, linguistically, and behaviorally for
participation in the collective liberal state); AMY GUTMANN, DEMOCRATIC
EDUCATION 50 (1987) (“Children are first educated by their parents, and so
must they continue to be as long as raising children constitutes one of our
most valued personal liberties.”); RAWLS, supra note 8, at 463–67 (describing
the parental role in children’s moral development); Bruce C. Hafen, The Constitutional Status of Marriage, Kinship, and Sexual Privacy—Balancing the
Individual and Social Interests, 81 MICH. L. REV. 463, 477 (1983) (“[T]he family in a democratic society not only provides emotional companionship, but is
also a principal source of moral and civic duty.”).
54. See ACKERMAN, supra note 8, at 141 (“[I]t will be enough to assume
that the infant needs some coherence if he is ever to find himself in the ranks
of a liberal citizenry. Once this assumption is allowed, a liberal theory of the
family appears . . . .”); BLUSTEIN, supra note 47, at 131 (“[I]t is to be expected
that parents will impart their own particular conceptions of the good to their
children . . . .”); Alstott, supra note 8, at 19 (“[F]amilies uniquely perform two
principal functions[: t]hey foster emotional and intellectual development via
continuity of care, and they foster moral development and cultural identity by
living a committed way of life . . . .”); John H. Garvey, Child, Parent, State,
and the Due Process Clause: An Essay on the Supreme Court’s Recent Work, 51
S. CAL. L. REV. 769, 821 (1978) (noting that the family instills in children “the
sense of belonging and having roots in a distinct tradition”); Hafen, supra note
53, at 477 (“American society has ‘relied to a considerable extent on the family
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noted that “[t]he child is not the mere creature of the State;
those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right,
coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for
additional obligations.”55 In Wisconsin v. Yoder, the Court elaborated that these “‘additional obligations’ . . . include the inculcation of moral standards, religious beliefs, and elements of
good citizenship.”56 More recently, a plurality of the Court
stated in Bellotti that “the guiding role of parents,” that is, the
“affirmative process of teaching, guiding, and inspiring by precept and example[,] is essential to the growth of young people
into mature, socially responsible citizens.”57 And in Moore v.
City of East Cleveland, the Court found that “[i]t is through the
family that we inculcate and pass down many of our most cherished values, moral and cultural.”58 The doctrine of family privacy reflects in part the well-accepted view that parental socialization encompasses initiation into a particular way of life.59
not only to nurture the young but also to instill the habits required for citizenship in a self-governing community [such as caring for others and moderating
self-interest].’” (quoting W. BERNS, THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE FUTURE
OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 222 (1976))).
55. Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925).
56. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 233 (1972).
57. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 637–38 (1979) (plurality opinion).
58. Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503–04 (1977) (plurality
opinion).
59. Cf. Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618–19 (1984) (“[C]ertain
kinds of personal bonds have played a critical role in the culture and traditions of the Nation by cultivating and transmitting shared ideals and beliefs;
they thereby foster diversity and act as critical buffers between the individual
and the power of the State.”). While some communitarian critics criticize liberal thinkers for promoting an atomistic conception of the unencumbered self,
see ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MORAL THEORY 30
(American ed., Univ. of Notre Dame Press 1981) (observing that the self is
more than merely the social roles that it inherits); Michael J. Sandel, The Procedural Republic and the Unencumbered Self, 12 POL. THEORY 81, 86 (1984)
(presenting the foundations of the unencumbered self “understood as prior to
and independent of purposes and ends”), most liberal theorists would acknowledge that children acquire a first set of values from their families of origin. See ACKERMAN, supra note 8, at 141 (“While the degree of cultural coherence required is a matter of great dispute, it will be enough to assume that the
infant needs some coherence if he is ever to find himself in the ranks of a liberal citizenry.”); ARCHARD, RIGHTS AND CHILDHOOD, supra note 3, at 82 (discussing how children’s capacity for self-determination “starts from a self ”);
BLUSTEIN, supra note 47, at 136 (“Autonomy, the ability to critically reflect on
oneself and the freedom to shape one’s life in accordance with changing desires
and aspirations, cannot exist in a vacuum; it presupposes some relatively settled beliefs, desires, etc., in short a self, to reason from and with.”); GUTMANN,
supra note 53, at 42 (discussing the necessary role of parents, with the state
and professional educators, in “cultivating moral character” in children);
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The Supreme Court has made clear that broad power to instill moral values in children does not belong to the state.60 Parental rights operate as an important limitation on the state’s
power to mold children through the indoctrination of morals.61
The Court’s early decisions in the area of public education provide the best example. As the Supreme Court famously stated
in Pierce, “The fundamental theory of liberty upon which all
governments in this Union repose excludes any general power
of the state to standardize its children.”62 Two years earlier in
Meyer v. Nebraska, the Supreme Court first recognized parents’
right to control the upbringing of their children free from governmental control.63 In so doing, the Court emphasized the
danger posed when a state attempts to “foster a homogenous
people.”64 Concern about the state’s unbridled power to standardize children has been present in Supreme Court cases involving parental challenges to the limits of public education for
almost a century.
As children develop, schools assume an increasingly critical role in the development of children’s decisionmaking
skills.65 As discussed above, Supreme Court decisions recognize
MACEDO, supra note 12, at 220 (“In making difficult choices we draw upon an
already existing sense of what is fundamentally important, and further articulate and shape that sense.”).
60. See Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 638 (“[A]ffirmative sponsorship of particular
ethical, religious, or political beliefs is something we expect the State not to
attempt in a society constitutionally committed to the ideal of individual liberty and freedom of choice.”); W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S.
624, 642 (1943) (“If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it
is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion . . . .”).
61. Cf. supra note 36 and accompanying text.
62. Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925).
63. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
64. Id. at 402; see also Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARV. L.
REV. 737, 785 (1989) (“The spectre of an insidious, thought-numbing standardization underlay the Barnette decision . . . .”).
65. See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988)
(“[E]ducation of the Nation’s youth is primarily the responsibility of parents,
teachers, and state and local school officials . . . .”); Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v.
Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681 (1986) (identifying the role and purpose of public
schools as preparing students for citizenship), modified on other grounds by
Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007); Laura A. Rosenbury, Between Home
and School, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 833, 839 (2007) (“[A]lthough families are major
sites for socializing children, states also play a socializing role . . . .”). The
state’s socializing authority is not restricted to the realm of education. The
first Supreme Court decision upholding state parens patriae power involved
state regulation of child labor. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 165
(1944) (acknowledging the state’s power to promote children’s “growth into
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a parental duty to make decisions on their children’s behalf until the age when the children can choose for themselves.66 In
contrast, schools are given the primary task of cultivating in
children the cognitive skills of choice67 and a studied perspective on their way of life through exposure to “the marketplace
of ideas.”68 As presented in Supreme Court decisions and commentary, critical learning and exposure to ideas are the main
features of the educational enterprise.69 Schools are expected to
foster children’s critical thinking and in doing so to provide an
objective perspective from which the child may assess his or her
received moral framework.70 Traditional choice theory as articulated by the Supreme Court and commentators anticipates
that parents will first socialize children into a particular way of
life, and then schools will give children the cognitive tools and
alternative views they will need in order to choose whether to
accept or reject their parents’ way of life as their own.71
free and independent well-developed men and citizens”). Similarly, in Ginsberg, the Court upheld the power of the state to prohibit the sale of pornography to minors on the ground that reading this material “may conceivably be
damaging” to children’s development. 390 U.S. 629, 642 n.10 (1968) (quoting
Willard M. Gaylin, The Prickly Problems of Pornography, 77 YALE L.J. 579,
592–93 (1968)).
66. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
67. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 655 (1971) (Brennan, J., concurring) (“The State’s interest in secular education may be defined broadly as
an interest in ensuring that all children within its boundaries acquire a minimum level of competency in certain skills, such as reading, writing, and
arithmetic, as well as a minimum amount of information and knowledge in
certain subjects such as history, geography, science, literature, and law.”). In
this regard, the meaning of the marketplace of ideas metaphor in school is
slightly different from its meaning in other spheres of public life. See Robert
Post, Reconciling Theory and Doctrine in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 88
CALIF. L. REV. 2353, 2363 (2000) (describing the truth-seeking function of the
marketplace of ideas).
68. Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 867–70 (1982); Tinker v. Des
Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 512 (1969).
69. See Alstott, supra note 8, at 7–8 (“A liberal education ideally would
prepare children to choose among diverse visions of the good; such an education should, among other things, foster the capacity to reason and provide cultural opportunities that differ from the child’s family background.”).
70. See id.
71. See, e.g., Pico, 457 U.S. at 868 (“[A]ccess [to ideas] prepares students
for active and effective participation in the pluralistic, often contentious society in which they will soon be adult members.”); Tinker, 393 U.S. at 512 (“The
Nation’s future depends upon leaders trained through wide exposure to that
robust exchange of ideas which discovers truth ‘out of a multitude of tongues,
[rather] than through any kind of authoritative selection.’” (quoting Keyishian
v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967))); ACKERMAN, supra note 8, at 162
(“[A] liberal education requires toleration—indeed, encouragement—of
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The traditional choice thesis is not negated by Supreme
Court decisions that take a broad view of the school’s role in inculcating democratic values in children.72 In a series of cases,
the Court has taken the position that public schools, while they
cannot be “enclaves of totalitarianism,”73 nevertheless do have
the authority and duty to instill certain civic values such as tolerance for opposing viewpoints and civility.74 The Court has
. . . doubts. It is only by questioning the seeming certainties of his early moral
environment that the child can begin to glimpse the larger world of value that
may be his for the asking.”); BLUSTEIN, supra note 47, at 132 (commenting
that children must develop “the psychological strengths and reflective and
critical abilities that enable them to reject [parental] attitudes and standards
if they so choose”); GUTMANN, supra note 53, at 30 (“[A state] makes choice
meaningful by equipping children with the intellectual skills necessary to evaluate ways of life different from that of their parents.”); Nomi Maya Stolzenberg, “He Drew a Circle that Shut Me Out”: Assimilation, Indoctrination, and
the Paradox of a Liberal Education, 106 HARV. L. REV. 581, 648 (1993) (“[Liberalism] assumes and values the ability of individuals to rationally, objectively,
and critically determine their attachments to competing ways of life by distancing themselves from any particular worldview.”).
72. See, e.g., Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 77 (1979). For a review of
some of the “voluminous” literature on “[t]he fundamental conflict in public
schools between the inculcation of values and a student marketplace of ideas,”
William G. Buss, School Newspapers, Public Forum, and the First Amendment,
74 IOWA L. REV. 505, 506 n.4 (1989), see id. passim. See also Mark G. Yudof,
Tinker Tailored: Good Faith, Civility, and Student Expression, 69 ST. JOHN’S
L. REV. 365, 366 (1995) (stating that public schools are increasingly “devoted
to the socialization of the young and to the inculcation of values and skills”).
73. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 511.
74. See Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681 (1986), modified on other grounds by Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007) (arguing
that public schools “‘must inculcate the habits and manners of civility as values in themselves conducive to happiness and as indispensable to the practice
of self-government in the community and the nation’” (quoting CHARLES A.
BEARD & MARY R. BEARD, NEW BASIC HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 228
(1968))); id. (“These fundamental values of ‘habits and manners of civility’ essential to a democratic society must, of course, include tolerance of divergent political and religious views, even when the views expressed may be unpopular.”);
New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 373 (1985) (Stevens, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (“Schools are places where we inculcate the values essential to the meaningful exercise of rights and responsibilities by a selfgoverning citizenry.”); Pico, 457 U.S. at 864 (“[T]here is a legitimate and substantial community interest in promoting respect for authority and traditional
values be they social, moral, or political.”); id. at 880 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (“[A]llowing a school board to [suppress ideas intentionally] hardly teaches
children to respect the diversity of ideas that is fundamental to the American
system.”); Ambach, 441 U.S. at 86 n.6 (contending that the purpose of public
education is the “inculcation of fundamental values . . . necessary to the maintenance of a democratic political system”). Schools also have the latitude to
impose discipline. See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508 (“The school officials banned
and sought to punish petitioners for a silent, passive expression of opinion,
unaccompanied by any disorder or disturbance on the part of petitioners.”).
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“acknowledged the importance of the public schools ‘in the
preparation of individuals for participation as citizens, and in
the preservation of the values on which our society rests.’”75
Thus, beginning with Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District,76 the Supreme Court has sought to balance the school’s role in providing a marketplace of ideas
against the school’s mission to discipline students in the art of
civil discourse. As Justice Black argued in his dissent in Tinker,
“School discipline, like parental discipline, is an integral part of
training our children to be good citizens—to be better citizens.”77
Nevertheless, although schools have latitude to teach basic
democratic values, most Supreme Court cases addressing the
matter also, implicitly, reinforce the prevailing choice model’s
emphasis on schools as a place of cognitive learning and exposure to ideas. The Court focuses on tolerance and civility as
among the values inculcated by schools; commentators, too,
stress tolerance, respect, and self-control as the central values
of a democratic education.78 But the values of tolerance, civility,
75. Pico, 457 U.S. at 876 (quoting Ambach, 441 U.S. at 76); see also id.
(“Because of the essential socializing function of schools, local education officials may attempt to promote civic virtues, and to awaken the child to cultural
values.” (internal citations omitted)).
76. 393 U.S. 503.
77. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 524 –25 (Black, J., dissenting); see also Yudof, supra note 72, at 368 (commenting that, in Justice Black’s view, “the whole
school enterprise is an instrument of socialization, an instrument for teaching
about discipline and disciplinary rules, and about the authority structure
within that school”).
78. Many scholars have described the “liberal values” in similar terms.
See MACEDO, supra note 12, at 251 (defining the “ideal liberal personality” as
characterized by “reflective self-awareness, active self-control, a willingness to
engage in self-criticism, an openness to change, and critical support for the
public morality of liberal justice”); see also WILLIAM A. GALSTON, LIBERAL
PURPOSES: GOODS, VIRTUES, AND DIVERSITY IN THE LIBERAL STATE 221–24,
227 (1991) (courage, law abidingness, loyalty, independence, toleration, capacity to discern and respect the rights of others, and willingness to engage in
public discourse); GUTMANN, supra note 53, at 44 (honesty, religious toleration, and mutual respect for persons); Will Kymlicka & Wayne Norman, Return of the Citizen: A Survey of Recent Work on Citizenship Theory, 104 ETHICS
352, 357–59, 366–67, 376–77 (1994) (“public reasonableness,” “political participation,” and “sense of common identity”); Judith N. Shklar, The Liberalism of
Fear, in LIBERALISM AND THE MORAL LIFE 21, 33 (Nancy L. Rosenblum ed.,
1989) (“habits of patience, self-restraint, respect for the claims of others, and
caution”); Tyll van Geel, The Search for Constitutional Limits on Governmental Authority to Inculcate Youth, 62 TEX. L. REV. 197, 275 (1983) (dignity, respect, and autonomy). But see MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, POETIC JUSTICE: THE
LITERARY IMAGINATION AND PUBLIC LIFE 12 (1995) (empathy and imagina-
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and respect are all closely associated with reasoned thinking.
Tolerance and civility imply a rational, objective perspective on
the world; they are the products of an intellectually controlled,
rather than impassioned, irrational, or even faith-based, state
of mind. Both tolerance and civility involve emotional composure and a disciplined respect for others’ points of view. And
exposure to diverse points of views is intended, at least in part,
to foster the kind of critical reflection about values associated
with cognitive rather than noncognitive thinking.
Obviously, not all the learning that goes on in school is
value neutral or cognitive in nature. Although value neutrality
is the constitutional standard for judging the activities of school
officials,79 schools clearly instill values other than tolerance
and civility, some going to the heart of ideas about moral right
and wrong.80 This value immersion is an inevitable byproduct
of an educational system. But apart from instilling patriotic
feelings,81 moral instruction has not been considered a legitimate mission of the public schools.82 The vision of the education); Steven H. Shiffrin, The First Amendment and the Socialization of Children: Compulsory Public Education and Vouchers, 11 CORNELL J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 503, 514 –22 (2002) (empathy, creativity, and imagination).
79. See Pico, 457 U.S. at 871 (“If petitioners intended by their removal decision to deny respondents access to ideas with which petitioners disagreed
. . . then petitioners have exercised their discretion in violation of the Constitution. To permit such intentions to control official actions would be to encourage the precise sort of officially prescribed orthodoxy unequivocally condemned
in Barnette.” (citing W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642
(1943))); Sch. Dist. of Abington v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963) (requiring that the government maintain neutrality with respect to religion in accordance with the First Amendment); Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535
(1925) (holding that there is “no general power of the State to standardize its
children”).
80. See, e.g., Mozert v. Hawkins Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058, 1068–
69 (6th Cir. 1987); see also Stolzenberg, supra note 71, at 644 –46. Roger Levesque has observed that “lower courts’ decisions, with some exceptions, reflect the ideology that school officials have the authority to inculcate the
shared values of their local communities and of the larger society.” Roger J.R.
Levesque, Educating American Youth: Lessons From Children’s Human Rights
Law, 27 J.L. & EDUC. 173, 185 (1998). These cases tend to arise in the context
of sex education or family life education programs. Id. at 186 n.79.
81. As early as 1943, the Court recognized the state’s interest in promoting
patriotic sentiments through rituals such as the Pledge of Allegiance. See Barnette, 319 U.S. at 640 (“National unity as an end which officials may foster by
persuasion and example is not in question.”); see also Ambach, 441 U.S. at 78
n.8 (“Flag and other patriotic exercises also are prescribed [in school], as loyalty is a characteristic of citizenship essential to the preservation of a country.”).
82. Several Supreme Court cases have emphasized the importance of
teachers as role models for children. See, e.g., Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v.
Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986) (“The process of educating our youth for citi-
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tional socialization process contained in the Supreme Court’s
First Amendment cases largely reinforces the view of school as
a center of critical (i.e., cognitive) learning.83
Thus the prevailing choice theory rests on a model of children’s socialization that associates the parental role with the
inculcation of values and the school’s role with the cultivation
of critical-thinking skills. This division of labor between parents and school has never been absolute.84 Moreover, parents
have the choice to homeschool their children or to send them to
religious school.85 As the Court stated in Everson v. Board of
zenship in public schools is not confined to books, the curriculum, and the civics class; schools must teach by example the shared values of a civilized social
order. Consciously or otherwise, teachers—and indeed the older students—
demonstrate the appropriate form of civil discourse and political expression by
their conduct and deportment in and out of class. Inescapably, like parents,
they are role models.”), modified on other grounds by Morse v. Frederick, 551
U.S. 393 (2007); Ambach, 441 U.S. at 78–79 (“[A] teacher serves as a role model for his students, exerting a subtle but important influence over their perceptions and values.”).
83. The distinction between critical thinking and moral indoctrination is
challenged by the fundamentalist critique of secular humanism in the public
schools. See Stolzenberg, supra note 71, at 651.
84. The division of labor between families and schools is a vestige of a
gendered philosophy of separate spheres that dates to the late nineteenth century. According to this philosophy, mothers worked in the domestic sphere to
provide children with an emotionally nurturing environment, while fathers
worked outside the home to support children financially and to provide them
with access to the broader public sphere of market work and politics. See, e.g.,
JEAN ELSHTAIN, PUBLIC MAN, PRIVATE WOMAN: WOMEN IN SOCIAL AND
POLITICAL THOUGHT 125–45 (1981); Frances E. Olsen, The Family and the
Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1497, 1504 –
13 (1983); Carole Pateman, Feminist Critiques of the Public/Private Dichotomy, in FEMINISM AND EQUALITY 103 (Anne Phillips ed., 1987). While the prevailing choice model of children’s upbringing no longer insists on a gendered
split between public and private, its emphasis on the family as the place
where private values are nurtured and on schools as the place where the public skills of critical thinking are taught retains elements of this gendered public-private divide. See SUSAN MOLLER OKIN, JUSTICE, GENDER, AND THE
FAMILY (1989); Anne C. Dailey, Constitutional Privacy and the Just Family, 67
TUL. L. REV. 955 (1993).
85. As Bruce Ackerman has noted, language acquisition is one way parents socialize children in a particular way of life. See ACKERMAN, supra note 8,
at 146–47; see also ARCHARD, RIGHTS AND CHILDHOOD, supra note 3, at 108
(discussing the importance of cognitive development in children); MACEDO, supra note 12, at 272 (arguing that children learn “something about due process,
and fairness, and respect for others” from families). Republican models of
children’s upbringing envisioned families, and particularly mothers, as the
primary source of civic education. See MICHAEL GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE
HEARTH: LAW AND THE FAMILY IN NINETEENTH CENTURY AMERICA 8 (1985);
LINDA K. KERBER, WOMEN OF THE REPUBLIC: INTELLECT AND IDEOLOGY IN
REVOLUTIONARY AMERICA 229 (1997).
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Education, “[P]arents may, in the discharge of their duty under
state compulsory education laws, send their children to a religious rather than a public school if the school meets the secular
educational requirements which the state has power to impose.”86 However, even here the Supreme Court has emphasized that “religious schools pursue two goals, religious instruction and secular education.”87 Thus, while religious schools
clearly impart moral values to their students, they are also under an obligation to instill secular skills that, presumably, encompass some elements of critical thinking. In addition, as already discussed, public schools are generally expected to
inculcate the basic values of a liberal democratic society, which
can go beyond toleration and civility to include “traditional values be they social, moral, or political.”88 Yet despite these important qualifications, the prevailing view of the relationship
between families and schools is not generally conceptualized as
a continuum of childrearing activity. Instead, the Supreme
Court and commentators emphasize the importance of parental
moral guidance, on the one hand, and a public education in critical-thinking skills on the other.
In summary, constitutional law denies children many, if
not most, adult rights on the ground that they lack autonomous
decisionmaking powers. But the prevailing choice theory of
children’s rights not only treats rights as incompatible with
children’s lack of autonomous decisionmaking capacity, but also
views them as affirmatively antithetical to their proper socialization at home and in school. As a plurality of the Court stated
in Bellotti, children’s autonomy rights potentially threaten “the
child’s chances for the full growth and maturity that make
eventual participation in a free society meaningful and rewarding.”89 Children’s autonomy rights in school potentially undermine development of critical-thinking skills by limiting school
authorities’ discipline in the classroom.90 Children’s right to

86. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947) (emphasis added) (citing
Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 524 (1925)).
87. Bd. of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 245 (1968).
88. Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 864 (1982) (internal citations omitted); see also Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 43 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681 (1986)
(averring schools’ responsibility to instill certain fundamental values in students), modified on other grounds by Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007).
89. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 638–39 (1979) (plurality opinion).
90. See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503,
513 (1969) (holding that student speech may be suppressed only where such
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make decisions in the family against parental wishes potentially undermines parental discipline and guidance.91 Choice
theory thus views children’s autonomy rights with deep skepticism. From the perspective of choice theory, children’s rights
pose a threat to the parental and state authority necessary for
the familial and educational socialization of children into autonomous adults and citizens.
B. CHILDREN’S “AUTONOMY” RIGHTS
The view that children’s lack of autonomous decisionmaking skills excludes them from the class of constitutional rightsholders still maintains a strong hold on the constitutional imagination. But even a cursory examination of the constitutional
decisions relating to children reveals that, over the past half
century, this idea has slowly given way to a number of rights
for children. In the 1960s and 1970s, children’s liberationists
argued that children should enjoy the full range of rights accorded to adults.92 Although children were never fully “liberated,” the Supreme Court began to recognize a limited number
of rights for children in a series of cases primarily involving
schools, reproductive choice, and juvenile justice.93 On the surface, these children’s rights cases suggest that older children
will be treated as adults in certain circumstances.94 Viewed in
this way, these autonomy rights for older adolescents do not
speech will “materially and substantially disrupt the work and discipline of
the school”).
91. See Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 638–39 (“[T]he guiding role of parents . . . is essential to the growth of young people into mature, socially responsible citizens.”).
92. See HOWARD COHEN, EQUAL RIGHTS FOR CHILDREN passim (1980);
RICHARD EVANS FARSON, BIRTHRIGHTS 191–227 (1974); SHULAMITH
FIRESTONE, THE DIALECTIC OF SEX: THE CASE FOR FEMINIST REVOLUTION 76–
104 (1993); Henry H. Foster, Jr. & Doris Jonas Freed, A Bill of Rights for
Children, 6 FAM. L.Q. 343, 344 (1972). See generally Minow, What Ever Happened to Children’s Rights?, supra note 3, at 270 (“[S]ome child liberationists
in the early 1970s viewed children as the next group entitled, like blacks and
women, to a civil rights revolution.”).
93. See generally, e.g., Bellotti, 443 U.S. 622 (children’s rights in public
schools); Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976) (reproductive choice); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) ( juvenile justice).
94. See, e.g., Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 404 –05 (2007) (noting that
high school students’ speech “in a public forum outside the school context
. . . would have been protected”); Vernonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646,
656 (1995) (upholding a child’s right to constitutional protection from unlawful
search and seizure); Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506 (“It can hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech
or expression at the schoolhouse gate.”).
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substantially revise the traditional choice thesis so much as renegotiate the time when an individual will be treated as an
adult for purposes of the specific right.
Upon closer inspection, however, these autonomy rights
cases turn out to be much more complicated. Frequently these
decisions often rest on traditional assumptions about children’s
immature decisionmaking skills, assumptions patently at odds
with choice theory’s view of rights as premised on the rightholder’s autonomy. Although the Supreme Court adopts the
rhetoric of choice theory in many cases, the reasoning often departs from choice theory’s autonomy-based view of rights.
These children’s rights cases point to the limitation of choice
theory as a general theory of children’s rights in constitutional
law, and thus open the door to conceiving of children’s rights
more broadly in socializing terms.
One of the first Supreme Court cases to recognize children’s rights was West Virginia State Board of Education v.
Barnette.95 In that case, the Court held that the state could not
compel school-aged children to recite the Pledge of Allegiance.96
Few decisions upholding children’s rights come as close as Barnette did to holding that children’s rights are “co-extensive with
those of adults.”97 The Court did not indicate that it was interpreting the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause in any
way differently than it would have had the school children been
adults. To the contrary, the Court went out of its way to emphasize that both parent and child “stand on a right of selfdetermination in matters that touch individual opinion and
personal attitude.”98 Nowhere did the Court inquire whether
the children were of a sufficient age to have independent beliefs
and religious views apart from their parents.99 Indeed, the case
is best known for its “fixed star” passage which still stands as
95. 319 U.S. 624 (1943). Barnette did not explicitly recognize children’s
First Amendment rights, but a year later in Prince the Supreme Court referred to Barnette as recognizing “the rights of children to exercise their religion.” Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 165 (1944).
96. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642 (“[T]he action of the local authorities in
compelling the flag salute and pledge transcends constitutional limitations on
their power and invades the sphere of intellect and spirit which it is the purpose of the First Amendment to our Constitution to reserve from all official
control.”).
97. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 515 (Stewart, J., concurring); see also infra text
accompanying note 140.
98. 319 U.S. at 631.
99. Cf. Robert A. Burt, Developing Constitutional Rights of, in, and for
Children, 39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 118, 124 (1975).
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the clearest expression of First Amendment rights held by all
persons.100
One appears to be on firm ground, then, in identifying
Barnette as one of the Court’s first cases recognizing children’s
independent autonomy rights. However, this characterization
must be qualified. The school board in Barnette had argued
strenuously that the state must be able to fulfill its educational
mission to foster a unified nation, which was not an insignificant concern in 1943. The Court responded that children’s liberty rather than their compelled participation best furthers
children’s growth into democratic citizens: “That they are educating the young for citizenship is reason for scrupulous protection of Constitutional freedoms of the individual, if we are not
to strangle the free mind at its source and teach youth to discount important principles of our government as mere platitudes.”101 Significantly, the Court concluded that children’s
First Amendment rights were the best way to instill the values
of democracy in developing children. Barnette thus introduces
the idea that children’s constitutional rights will be protected
in part on the ground that these rights will promote, rather
than impede, children’s democratic socialization.
Tinker expresses a similar concern with children’s socialization.102 The Tinker case is best known for its express holding
that First Amendment rights are available to students: “It can
hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed their
constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the
schoolhouse gate.”103 The students in Tinker were suspended
for wearing black armbands in protest of the Vietnam War.104
Like Barnette, Tinker is in part a tribute to the intrinsic importance of children’s autonomy rights:
In our system, state-operated schools may not be enclaves of totalitarianism. School officials do not possess absolute authority over their
students. Students in school as well as out of school are “persons” under our Constitution. They are possessed of fundamental rights which
the State must respect, just as they themselves must respect their obligations to the State. In our system, students may not be regarded as
closed-circuit recipients of only that which the State chooses to com100. Barnett, 319 U.S. at 642 (“If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what
shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion
or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein.”).
101. Id. at 638–39.
102. Tinker, 393 U.S. 503.
103. Id. at 506.
104. Id. at 504.
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municate. They may not be confined to the expression of those sentiments that are officially approved. In the absence of a specific showing of constitutionally valid reasons to regulate their speech, students
are entitled to freedom of expression of their views.105

Justice Stewart confirmed the broad scope of the autonomy
rights authorized by the majority. As he argued in his concurrence, the majority promoted the idea that “school discipline
aside, the First Amendment rights of children are co-extensive
with those of adults.”106
Yet despite its strong language upholding children’s autonomy rights in school, the Tinker Court justified its holding in
part on the ground that recognizing children’s free speech
rights in school would help prepare them for adult citizenship.107 The Court turned for support to the “marketplace of
ideas” metaphor: “The classroom is peculiarly the ‘marketplace
of ideas.’ The Nation’s future depends upon leaders trained
through wide exposure to that robust exchange of ideas which
discovers truth ‘out of a multitude of tongues, (rather) than
through any kind of authoritative selection.’”108 The “marketplace of ideas”—that traditional sphere of adult self-expression
and collective truth seeking—is treated here as a mechanism
for instilling the skills of democratic life in developing children.109 In Tinker, as in Barnette, the Court defined the right at
stake in part as an autonomy right and in part as a right directed to children’s political socialization.
Subsequent Supreme Court cases in the school context
have addressed the socializing role of children’s First Amendment rights as well. In Board of Education v. Pico, for example,
the plurality held that students’ First Amendment rights prohibit school boards from removing books from the school library
for the purpose of restricting access to undesirable ideas.110
This doctrine affirms that “the First Amendment . . . does not
tolerate laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom.”111 In Pico, as in Barnette and Tinker, the Court uses
105. Id. at 511.
106. Id. at 514 –15 (Stewart, J., concurring).
107. See id. at 512 (plurality opinion).
108. Id. (quoting Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967)).
109. As Robert Post has explained, the “marketplace of ideas” metaphor, in
theory, furthers the truth-seeking purpose of the First Amendment. See Post,
supra note 67, at 2363. Others have emphasized the autonomy-enhancing
purpose of the First Amendment. See, e.g., THOMAS EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 6 (1970).
110. Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 871 (1982).
111. Id. at 870 (quoting Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 603).
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language affirming that “students do not ‘shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.’”112 Included among these rights, the plurality held,
is the First Amendment right “to receive information and
ideas.”113 But also as in Tinker, the plurality went on to describe how access to ideas not only makes it possible for students to exercise their free speech rights “in a meaningful
manner,”114 but it also “prepares students for active and effective participation in the pluralistic, often contentious society in
which they will soon be adult members.”115 The right of access
to ideas in this case is understood to serve the dual ends of preserving children’s individual freedom of expression and of fostering the development of their minds as future autonomous
adults and citizens.
The conception of rights as serving a socializing function—
for example, that the right of free speech is directed to developing children’s capacities rather than an entitlement which protects an already-existing capacity—reflects the Court’s deepseated ambivalence over the idea of children’s autonomy.
Children’s rights cases in the First Amendment context capture
children’s unique developmental status as both semiautonomous individuals with some capacity for autonomous
expression and as developing individuals and citizens. Certainly these cases are at odds with choice theory’s traditional view
of rights as emancipating children from the socialization
process. To the extent that the rights recognized in Barnette,
Tinker, and Pico are understood to further the socialization of
children, these cases refute choice theory’s insistence on the
mature decisionmaking capacity of the right-holder.
Children’s rights cases in the area of juvenile justice also
fail to fit the traditional choice notion of autonomy rights. The
juvenile justice system has roots in the child-saving movement
of the early twentieth century.116 The denial of constitutional
rights in this system rested on the idea that the state was acting in its capacity as parens patriae taking care of dependent
112. Id. at 865 (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506).
113. Id. at 867 (quoting Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969)).
114. Id. at 868.
115. Id.; see also id. (“[S]tudents must always remain free to inquire, to
study and to evaluate, to gain new maturity and understanding.” (quoting
Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 603)).
116. See ANTHONY M. PLATT, THE CHILD SAVERS: THE INVENTION OF
DELINQUENCY 177–78 (1969); ELLEN RYERSON, THE BEST-LAID PLANS:
AMERICA’S JUVENILE COURT EXPERIMENT 4 (1978).
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children unable to make decisions for themselves.117 The modern recognition of children’s procedural rights in the juvenile
justice context might therefore be taken to reflect an affirmation of children’s autonomy interests.118 Yet, to the contrary,
many of these cases reveal special solicitude on the part of the
Court for children’s immature decisionmaking capacities.
The Supreme Court’s first case involving the criminal
prosecution of a minor in adult court was Powell v. Alabama,119
although the defendants’ ages were not actually known to the
Court.120 In Powell, the African American defendants had been
convicted of raping two white girls, and were sentenced to
death. The Court held that the defendants’ right to counsel was
denied in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Nowhere in the opinion does the Court suggest
that the Due Process Clause might not apply because the defendants were “youthful,” which suggests an assumption that
procedural protections applied to children in criminal court in
the same way they applied to adults. Nevertheless, while the
decision might appear to be a straightforward application of
adult rights to children, the Court’s reasoning emphasizes their
youthfulness as a factor in finding that “the failure of the trial
court to give them reasonable time and opportunity to secure
counsel was a clear denial of due process.”121 The scope of the
rights was defined in part by reference to the immaturity of the
defendants.
Haley v. Ohio was the Court’s second case involving children prosecuted in adult court.122 Haley involved a fifteen-yearold African American boy accused of murder; at issue in the
case was the voluntariness of the child’s murder confession un117. See, e.g., Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 265 (1984) (“Children, by definition, are not assumed to have the capacity to take care of themselves.”);
McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 551–52 (1971) (White, J., concurring)
(rejecting the minor’s due process right to trial by jury in a delinquency proceeding and concluding that “[r]eprehensible acts by juveniles are not deemed
the consequence of mature and malevolent choice but of environmental pressures (or lack of them) or of other forces beyond their control”).
118. See, e.g., In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 365 (1970) (“The same considerations that demand extreme caution in factfinding to protect the innocent
adult apply as well to the innocent child.”).
119. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
120. Id. at 51–52 (“The record does not disclose their ages, except that one
of them was nineteen; but the record clearly indicates that most, if not all, of
them were youthful, and they are constantly referred to as ‘the boys.’”).
121. Id. at 71.
122. Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948).
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der the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.123
Haley, like Powell, can be read to express the idea that children
should be treated as adults for purposes of constitutional law.
In some passages, the Supreme Court indicated that children’s
and adults’ due process rights are coextensive: “Neither man
nor child can be allowed to stand condemned by methods which
flout constitutional requirements of due process of law.”124
However, as in Powell, the Court did take the defendant’s age
into account when assessing whether the methods of interrogation in this case were coercive.125 And with respect to whether
the defendant had waived his rights, the Court concluded that
“a boy of fifteen” did not have “freedom of choice.”126 Thus, the
Haley Court walked a fine line between treating children the
same as adults for purposes of conferring the right, but distinguishing children when applying the right to the particular
context of the case.
In re Gault was the Supreme Court’s first decision bestowing procedural due process rights on children in the juvenile
justice system.127 Gault is the case most cited as marking the
start of the children’s rights movement in constitutional law.
The decision is understood to have ushered in this new period
in children’s rights with the oft-quoted phrase: “[N]either the
Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill of Rights is for adults
alone.”128 Supporting this view of Gault, later Supreme Court
cases have characterized the decision as standing for the proposition that “the child’s right is virtually coextensive with that of
an adult.”129 After cataloguing at length the ways in which the
juvenile court had failed to benefit children, the Court announced that “the essentials of due process and fair treatment”
apply to the adjudication of a delinquent child in juvenile

123. Id. at 596.
124. Id. at 601.
125. Id. at 599 (“What transpired would make us pause for careful inquiry
if a mature man were involved. And when, as here, a mere child—an easy victim of the law—is before us, special care in scrutinizing the record must be
used. Age 15 is a tender and difficult age for a boy of any race. He cannot be
judged by the more exacting standards of maturity. That which would leave a
man cold and unimpressed can overawe and overwhelm a lad in his early
teens. This is the period of great instability which the crisis of adolescence
produces.”).
126. Id. at 601.
127. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
128. Id. at 13.
129. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 634 (1979) (plurality opinion).
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court.130 The Court specifically held that children have a right
to notice of the charges being brought against them, a right to
counsel, a right to confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses, and a privilege against self-incrimination.131
At first glance, Gault seems to fit comfortably within the
traditional choice theory of rights. The Gault Court based its
reasoning on the ground that “[t]here is no material difference
. . . between adult and juvenile proceedings.”132 Some subsequent cases also hold that the “same considerations” apply to
both adult and juvenile proceedings.133 It is certainly possible
to interpret Gault and other cases as recognizing children’s autonomy interests, particularly because these cases capture the
Court’s view that the juvenile justice system was no longer operating on the premise of children’s innocence, but more like an
adult system orientated toward punishment. To this extent,
these cases exhibit a movement toward treating children as autonomous agents responsible for their decisions and behavior
and entitled to adult procedural protections.
However, upon closer examination, Gault also reveals the
Court’s ambivalent attitude toward children’s autonomy. The
case is not primarily concerned with the decisionmaking maturity of the child, but rather with the child’s vulnerability to state
overreaching. The theme of children’s special vulnerability in
the juvenile justice system, and the need for rights to protect
children from state overreaching, is implicit through the
Court’s discussion.134 The Court noted that “both common observation and expert opinion emphasize that the ‘distrust of
confessions made in certain situations’ . . . is imperative in the
case of children from an early age through adolescence.”135
Thus, while children have access to some of the same criminal
130. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 30 (quoting Kent v. United States, 383 U.S.
541, 562 (1966)).
131. Id. at 33, 41, 55, 56.
132. Id. at 36.
133. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 365 (1970) (requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt in juvenile proceedings); see also Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565,
574 (1975) (requiring “fundamentally fair procedures” when the State withdraws rights). Children have access to some but not all criminal procedure
rights. See McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 551 (1971) (holding that
there is no right to trial by jury in a delinquency proceeding).
134. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 36 (“The child ‘requires the guiding hand
of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him.’” (quoting Powell v.
Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932))).
135. Id. at 48 (quoting 3 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 822 (3d ed.
1940)).
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procedure rights as adults, it is not exclusively on the ground of
their enhanced autonomous decisionmaking skills but instead—somewhat paradoxically—their enhanced psychological
vulnerability.
Gault stands for the proposition that the Supreme Court
will address children’s procedural due process rights in the juvenile justice system in light of their special cognitive immaturity as children. The Court in Bellotti commented upon the
Gault line of cases, noting its “concern for the vulnerability of
children . . . in its decisions dealing with minors’ claims to constitutional protection against deprivations of liberty or property
interests by the State.”136 What may look like children’s autonomy rights—treating children the same as adults for purposes
of criminal proceedings—actually has only a passing surface
resemblance. Powell, Haley, and Gault all turn on children’s
differences—their special status as children with impaired decisionmaking skills. This fact is evident in the Court’s discussion of the waiver of these constitutional rights. The Haley
Court had concluded that the child had no “freedom of choice”
and therefore any asserted waiver was invalid.137 In Gault, although the Court refers to “a waiver of the right to counsel
which [the mother] and her juvenile son had,” the Court only
discusses the mother’s actions in this regard.138 Nothing suggests the Gault Court meant to depart from the decision in Haley that children are not, with respect to waiver at least, to be
treated as autonomous decisionmaking adults.
Cases addressing children’s procedural due process rights
in contexts other than the criminal justice system reveal a similar concern with children’s immature decisionmaking skills. In
Goss v. Lopez, for example, the Court held that children have a
right to a hearing in connection with being suspended from
school.139 Citing Barnette and Tinker, the Court used broad
language suggesting that children’s rights are coextensive with
those of adults.140 The Court also assumed that children are
capable of participating in an informal hearing in a mature
manner.141 However, the Court stopped short of granting chil136. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 634 (1979) (plurality opinion).
137. Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 601 (1948).
138. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 42.
139. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 582 (1975).
140. Id. at 574.
141. See id. at 582 (noting that the accused student must be given an opportunity to explain).
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dren anything close to a full adversarial hearing, in part on the
ground that doing so might interfere with the “the teaching
process.”142 Ultimately Goss, like Tinker and Gault before it,
does not endorse the idea that children’s rights rest on the full
decisionmaking autonomy of older children.143 To the contrary,
these rights derive in part from the recognition of children’s
immature decisionmaking capacities.
Decisions concerning children’s rights in the area of reproductive choice also assume children’s impaired choice, although
this was not true at the beginning of this line of cases. Planned
Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth came very close to
holding that adolescent girls have the same rights as adults
based on their mature decisionmaking capacities.144 In this
case, the Supreme Court held that the state cannot impose a
parental consent requirement on minor girls seeking an abortion. Citing Gault and Tinker, the Court famously confirmed
that “[c]onstitutional rights do not mature and come into being
magically only when one attains the state-defined age of majority. Minors, as well as adults, are protected by the Constitution
and possess constitutional rights.”145 The Court did go on to
qualify its sweeping statement by noting that “the State has
somewhat broader authority to regulate the activities of children than of adults.”146 But the parental consent provision was
struck down with very little discussion except that the Court
clarified that it was protecting “the right of privacy of the competent minor mature enough to have become pregnant.”147
With this observation, the Danforth Court suggested that
girls who engage in sexual activity leading to pregnancy are to
be treated the same as adult women for purposes of the decision whether to terminate their pregnancies. Unlike the First
Amendment and due process rights discussed above, the privacy right recognized in Danforth does emancipate minor girls
from the socialization process, in this case from the decisionmaking authority of their parents. Surprisingly, the Court dis142. Id. at 583.
143. The dissent discusses at length the traditional themes associated with
the dependency thesis: that children’s due process rights will adversely affect
the school’s ability to maintain “discipline and good order,” and that there are
differences between adults and children that the law must recognize. Id. at
590–91 (Powell, J., dissenting).
144. Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
145. Id. at 74.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 75.
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missed the effect of the case on the parental role in raising
children. Indeed, it was the parents’ decisionmaking that was
described as potentially “arbitrary,” and the minor’s decisionmaking that was construed as potentially a mature, reasonable
determination reached in consultation with the physician.148
Only one year later, in Carey v. Population Services International, a plurality of the Court revised its position on the
question of pregnant girls’ autonomy.149 In an opinion by Justice Brennan, the plurality began by describing the issue of
children’s rights as a “vexing one, perhaps not susceptible of
precise answer.”150 Despite this reluctance to define “the totality of the relationship of the juvenile and the state,” the plurality enunciated certain principles, most importantly the fact that
children possess some rights that must be balanced against
state interests in controlling their conduct.151 Although the plurality recognized the privacy right in the case, it clarified that
the test to be applied in cases involving the privacy rights of
minors is “less rigorous” than the compelling interest test applied to state restrictions on adult privacy.152 In a dramatic departure from Danforth, the Court now emphasized that the
right of privacy protects the interest “‘in making certain kinds
of important decisions’ . . . and the law has generally regarded
minors as having a lesser capacity for making important decisions.”153 The theme of children’s impaired capacity for choice
thus reemerged in this line of reproductive choice cases as well.
Bellotti most dramatically illustrates the constitutional collision between the Court’s assumption of children’s impaired
capacity for choice and the choice theory of rights.154 This case
also offers one of the only Supreme Court opinions to attempt a
systematic overview of children’s constitutional rights. Here a
plurality of the Court identified three reasons “justifying the
conclusion that the constitutional rights of children cannot be
equated with those of adults: the peculiar vulnerability of
children; their inability to make critical decisions in an informed, mature manner; and the importance of the parental

148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

Id. at 74.
Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (plurality opinion).
Id. at 692.
Id. (quoting In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13 (1967)).
Id. at 693 n.15.
Id. (quoting Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 489, 599–600 (1977)).
Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979) (plurality opinion).
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role in child rearing.”155 The plurality emphasized “the inability
of children to make mature choices” as a central justification
for state laws requiring parental consent in the abortion context.156 In the plurality’s words, “That is a grave decision, and a
girl of tender years, under emotional stress, may be illequipped to make it without mature advice and emotional support.”157 The picture painted here of a “girl of tender years” is a
far cry from the mature pregnant minor described in Danforth.
The plurality also stressed “the guiding role of parents in
the upbringing of their children.”158 In the plurality’s view, the
deference accorded to parental decisionmaking authority reflected that “[t]his affirmative process of teaching, guiding, and
inspiring by precept and example is essential to the growth of
young people into mature, socially responsible citizens.”159 The
plurality affirmed that parental authority is essential to preserving the values of a liberal democratic state:
Properly understood, then, the tradition of parental authority is not
inconsistent with our tradition of individual liberty; rather, the former is one of the basic presuppositions of the latter. Legal restrictions
on minors, especially those supportive of the parental role, may be
important to the child’s chances for the full growth and maturity that
make eventual participation in a free society meaningful and rewarding.160

The plurality at this point cites to a well-known article by
Bruce Hafen arguing against recognizing broad autonomy
rights for children.161
Having set out the broad principles governing children’s
rights, the Bellotti plurality ultimately held that the parental
consent requirement at issue in the case violated the pregnant
girl’s right to privacy by denying her judicial authorization for
an abortion even where the court had found her “to be mature
and fully competent to make this decision independently.”162 In
the context of reproductive choice, pregnant minors have the
right to go to court and obtain a determination that they are
mature enough to make the decision whether to terminate a
155. Id. at 634.
156. Id. at 636.
157. Id. at 641 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428
U.S. 52, 91 (1976) (Stewart, J., concurring)).
158. Id. at 637.
159. Id. at 638.
160. Id. at 638–39.
161. Id. at n.17 (citing generally Hafen, supra note 3).
162. Id. at 651.
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pregnancy on their own.163 The right recognized in Bellotti is a
classic autonomy right to the extent it emancipates mature minors on a case-by-case basis from the decisionmaking authority
of their parents.
The Bellotti decision captures the Court’s deep ambivalence over the nature and origin of children’s constitutional
rights. On the one hand, the Court at times has come close to
recognizing children’s rights based on children’s mature decisionmaking skills; Bellotti is perhaps the clearest example of
this approach. In many of the cases described here, however,
the Court walks an unexamined line between acknowledging
children’s autonomy interests and recognizing their immature
decisionmaking skills. While children’s autonomy interests
clearly do play some role in the constitutional jurisprudence relating to children, they are overshadowed by the many cases
that conceive of rights as protecting vulnerable children or as
fostering the socialization process leading to adult autonomy.
C. THE LIMITATIONS OF CHOICE THEORY
This section reviews the descriptive and normative limitations of choice theory as a framework for children’s constitutional rights. Critiques of choice theory and its emphasis on
children’s autonomy rights already abound. The prevailing critique of choice theory comes from scholars who argue that the
theory fails to take into account children’s welfare and relational interests. These scholars fall into different camps. Some
critics draw on the rival interest theory of rights to argue directly in favor of children’s welfare rights.164 In the view of
163. The Court held the statute unconstitutional because “it requires parental consultation or notification in every instance, without affording the
pregnant minor an opportunity to receive an independent judicial determination that she is mature enough to consent or that an abortion would be in her
best interests.” Id.
164. See, e.g., DWYER, supra note 3, at 125–40 (discussing the welfarebased justifications for children’s rights); Archard & Macleod, supra note 3, at
5 (describing the interest theory of children’s rights under which “the primary
function of rights is the protection of fundamental interests”); Samantha
Brennan, Children’s Choices or Children’s Interests: Which Do Their Rights
Protect?, in The MORAL AND POLITICAL STATUS OF CHILDREN, supra note 3, at
53, 54 –57 (contrasting interest theory with choice theory); Campbell, supra
note 3, at 5 (“[T]he more attractive theory of rights is that which relates rights
to the normative defence and furtherance of interests.”); Ferdinand Schoeman,
Childhood Competence and Autonomy, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 267, 268 (1983)
(“[T ]he protection of relationships, and not just the issue of judgmental capacity, is an important factor to take into account when considering the moral status of the child.”). The welfare theory of rights has strong support among pro-
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these scholars, children’s rights should be rooted in children’s
fundamental welfare interests rather than children’s autonomy. Other critics emphasize that choice theory misunderstands
children’s fundamental need for protection and discipline rather than liberty.165 These scholars would prefer a legal discourse
that focuses on governmental or societal duties rather than
rights. Finally, some theorists object to choice theory’s focus on
autonomy.166 In this regard, feminist and communitarian scholars reject choice theory because it privileges the ideal of the autonomous individual over social relationships, community ties,
and caregiving.
While contemporary critics of choice theory have much to
offer the debate over children’s constitutional rights, this Article ultimately does not share the view that children’s rights
are fundamentally misguided or that autonomy is not a value
worth preserving. To the contrary, this Article argues that critics who prefer a discourse of interests over rights undervalue
the important role that rights can play in socializing children to
become autonomous adults and citizens. Moreover, feminist
ponents of children’s rights. See, e.g., DWYER, supra note 3, at 293–94 (discussing children’s welfare rights theories).
165. See, e.g., MARTIN GUGGENHEIM, WHAT’S WRONG WITH CHILDREN’S
RIGHTS 252 (2005) (discussing the law’s facilitation of juvenile prosecutions
and commenting that “the juvenile rights advocate is well advised to try to
find a different way of advancing children’s interests than through the rhetoric
of ‘rights’”); LAURA M. PURDY, IN THEIR BEST INTERESTS? THE CASE AGAINST
EQUAL RIGHTS FOR CHILDREN 41–43 (1992) (making a case against liberationists); Hafen, supra note 3, at 650 (“[T]he development of the capacity for responsible choice selection is an educational process in which growth can be
smothered and stunted if unlimited freedom and unlimited responsibility are
thrust too soon upon the young.”); Onora O’Neill, Children’s Rights and Children’s Lives, in CHILDREN, RIGHTS, AND THE LAW 24, 25 (Philip Alston et al.
eds., 1992) (arguing for a focus on obligations to children rather than children’s rights).
166. See MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE
SEXUAL FAMILY AND OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES 14 (Routledge
1995); LINDA C. MCCLAIN, THE PLACE OF FAMILIES: FOSTERING CAPACITY,
EQUALITY, AND RESPONSIBILITY 18 (2006) (discussing the relational approach
to family law that recognizes that “the self is socially situated and develops in
the context of, rather than independent of, society and relationships”);
MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE 283 (1990) (arguing for a
theory of rights “reconstructed as features of important, communal relationships”); Federle, supra note 4, at 1017 (“Feminists object to notions of autonomy and individuality as fundamentally hierarchical and patriarchal because
these principles emphasize power and minimalize the interconnectedness of
human beings.”); Minow, Rights for the Next Generation, supra note 3, at 24
(arguing for “a richer debate over the rights for children—a debate joining
goals of autonomy and goals of affiliation”).
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critics of autonomy tend to overlook the deeply creative and relational dimensions of the capacity for choosing how to lead
one’s life. As this Article argues, an ideal of autonomy that
takes into account the full range of psychological skills relevant
to autonomous choice emphasizes the cognitive, emotional, and
imaginative components of choice and their developmental
roots in the early caregiving relationship.
This section critiques the choice theory of children’s rights
from a different perspective. The argument has two parts.
First, choice theory fails to acknowledge the important socializing function of children’s rights, and second, it rests on an excessively rationalist account of autonomy. These two shortcomings—having to do with the socializing function and the
psychology of children’s rights—are discussed in turn.
1. The Socializing Function of Children’s Rights
With respect to the function of children’s rights, the review
of Supreme Court decisions above makes clear that these decisions cannot be squared doctrinally with choice theory’s emphasis on the emancipating role of children’s rights. From the
choice theory perspective, the emergence of children’s rights
signifies a movement in the direction of bestowing adult rights
on older children based on their increasing capacity for autonomous decisionmaking.167 But children’s constitutional rights
do not always—or even largely—look like adult rights or turn
on assumptions about children’s autonomy.168 Indeed, few constitutional rights held by children can be conceptualized as
pure autonomy rights, that is, adult rights that follow from older children’s possession of mature decisionmaking skills. To
briefly summarize from the discussion above, children’s First
Amendment rights in school serve in part the end of socializing
immature children in the ways of democracy; children’s due
process rights in the juvenile justice system are premised on
children’s special vulnerability; and children’s reproductive
167. See Buss, supra note 4, at 363 (“What is common to all is that children, at best, get adult rights.”); Campbell, supra note 3, at 18 (“We could regard the movement for children’s rights as being, in this way, a movement towards giving adult rights to children.”).
168. Theorists have pointed out that children’s procedural due process and
property rights never turn on protecting the autonomy of the right-holder. See,
e.g., Buss, supra note 4, at 359 (“Many of the Court’s children’s rights cases,
however, do not consider children’s right to make choices.”); Garvey, supra
note 13, at 1761 n.27 (observing that children’s due process rights do not turn
on the right-holder’s agency).

2138

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[95:2099

choice rights shift power to the courts to determine on a case by
case basis whether a pregnant girl is mature enough to make
the decision on her own.169 Although we might be inclined to
view these decisions as recognizing children’s adult autonomy
rights, it is nevertheless clear that these rights also reflect, to
varying degrees, concerns about children’s status as immature
decisionmakers.
Similarly, the choice theory of children’s rights does not
pretend to account for a variety of Supreme Court cases recognizing children’s unique rights based on their developmental
vulnerability or immaturity. These are cases involving rights
unique to children. For example, in Roper, the Supreme Court
held that the individual has an Eighth Amendment right not to
be executed for crimes committed as a minor, a right not available to individuals who committed crimes as adults.170 The
Court based its decision on children’s lack of decisionmaking
autonomy, citing extensive developmental data on the subject.171 Further, in Lee v. Weisman, the Court held that children
have a First Amendment right against the inclusion of prayers
in public school graduations.172 The right in Weisman is not a
right available to adults, but instead a right premised on children’s specific vulnerability to coercion.173 Choice theory does
not account for cases such as these, which confer special rights
on children based on their immature decisionmaking capacities. Rather than liberating children, as autonomy rights would
do, this special class of rights protects vulnerable children from
harm resulting from their decisionmaking immaturity.
Choice theory’s focus on the emancipating role of rights also cannot justify or explain the decision in Brown v. Board of
Education. Clearly Brown cannot be treated as a standard autonomy rights case. No one would argue that the Court’s decision in Brown turned on children’s capacity for autonomous
choice since the whole point of the decision was the importance
of fostering children’s educational socialization.174 The equality
169. See supra Part I.B.
170. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 574 (2005).
171. Id. at 569–70.
172. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 599 (1992).
173. Id. at 597–99 (discussing the uniqueness of public schools in the evaluation of a state’s coercive impact).
174. See Dailey, supra note 50, at 445 (“Brown took a further step in the
direction of working out the role of the State in the political socialization of
children.”). The fact that Brown fails to fit within the modern choice framework may explain why constitutional law scholars treat the case primarily as
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right recognized in Brown and in subsequent cases protects the
child’s underlying interest in education and reinforces the role
of education in the socializing process.175 Rather than liberating children, Brown’s equality right furthers the child’s interest
in developing the skills of autonomous decisionmaking. Unlike
autonomy rights, which by definition follow from children’s already-acquired autonomy skills, educational rights are oriented
toward children becoming autonomous adults and citizens.176
Brown’s express emphasis on children’s lack of adult decisionmaking capacities, its reliance on the then-existing developmental literature, and its recognition of rights as furthering
children’s socialization, all cannot be squared with the choice
theory of rights.
Thus, choice theory is not so much wrong as it is limited.
To the extent the theory views children’s rights in terms of
their emancipating function, the theory provides no conceptual
framework for understanding that rights can play an essential
role in furthering children’s socialization into autonomous
adults. Indeed, as described above, children’s rights often foster
both emancipating and socializing ends. To take the most famila race discrimination case and only secondarily—if at all—as a seminal children’s rights case. Indeed, most constitutional law treatises and casebooks discuss Brown at length but fail to situate it in the context of children’s rights.
See, e.g., GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 475–80 (5th ed.
2005) (identifying Brown as a major race discrimination case).
175. As is well known, the Court in Brown emphasized that education is a
prerequisite to citizenship in a democratic republic:
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and
local governments. Compulsory school attendance laws and the great
expenditures for education both demonstrate our recognition of the
importance of education to our democratic society. It is required in
the performance of our most basic public responsibilities, even service
in the armed forces. It is the very foundation of good citizenship.
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
176. See, e.g., Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986)
(examining “[t]he process of educating our youth for citizenship in public
schools”), modified on other grounds by Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393
(2007); Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 76 (1979) (noting “[t]he importance of
public schools in the preparation of individuals for participation as citizens”);
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 221 (1972) (“[S]ome degree of education is
necessary to prepare citizens to participate effectively and intelligently in our
open political system if we are to preserve freedom and independence.”); Amy
Gutmann, Children, Paternalism, and Education: A Liberal Argument, 9 PHIL.
& PUB. AFF. 338, 349 (1980) (“[A] child’s right to compulsory education is a
precondition to becoming a rational human being and a full citizen of a liberal
democratic society.”); Graham Haydon, “The Right to Education” and Compulsory Schooling, 9 EDUC. PHIL. & THEORY 1, 8 (1977) (“[T]here is a human right
. . . to be an autonomous person.”).
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iar example, the Tinker Court’s recognition of children’s right
to wear black armbands in school in part liberates children
from the educational authority of school officials. But the
Court’s decision also makes clear that the wearing of the arm
bands actually fosters the educational mission of inculcating
the values and skills of democratic life in developing children.177 Because it views rights as functioning to emancipate
older children, choice theory cannot conceptualize rights as performing a socializing function in children’s lives. Moreover, the
descriptive limitations of choice theory correspond to a limitation in the underlying justification for children’s rights. Choice
theory views rights as deriving from the already acquired decisionmaking autonomy of the individual. But as described in
greater detail below, choice theory neglects the fact that rights
for children might legitimately be rooted in children’s status as
future autonomous individuals and citizens.
2. Psychological Assumptions About Choice
The second major limitation of the prevailing choice theory
relates to its psychological assumptions about choice. The
theory has long rested on a presumption that competent adults
possess the necessary decisionmaking skills.178 With respect to
adults, there has traditionally been no need for a psychological
theory at all, beyond a minimum standard of mental capacity
or competence. Similarly, the traditional choice theory obviated
the need for a psychological account of autonomous choice with
respect to children, who were simply treated under the opposite
presumption—that they lacked decisionmaking skills. But
choice theory recognizes children’s rights based on their developing capacity for autonomous choice, and thus the need for a
psychological model of the skills of decisionmaking has
emerged.179
177. Cf. Burt, supra note 99, at 122–24 (explaining that, given the reality
of parental authority over children, the right in Tinker protected the parents’
rather than the child’s interest in free expression).
178. See, e.g., ACKERMAN, supra note 8, at 96 (“Everybody who has reached
an age where a human being can typically satisfy the tests of dialogue and behavior should be presumed to be a full citizen of the liberal state.”); Archard,
Free Speech, supra note 4, at 93 (“At a certain age, the child becomes mature
enough to make her own choices.”).
179. See Schoeman, supra note 164, at 269 (“Even though we acknowledge
that judgmental capacities are relevant to recognition of rights to selfdetermination, we do not know, short of the grossest incompetence, what exact
level of competence should be related to abridging specific rights paternalistically.”); Wald, supra note 1, at 269 n.59 (“[C]riteria for ‘good’ decision-making
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As described above, most children’s rights cases emphasize
the notion of children’s impaired capacity for decisionmaking.180 Case after case highlights the point that children are not
yet “fully rational, choosing agent[s].”181 We see the extent to
which autonomous choice means rational choice in the context
of the First Amendment school cases, where the Court has emphasized the role of public schools in inculcating critical thinking, tolerance, and civility—all attributes of a rational and
emotionally disciplined state of mind.182 Cases exploring the
classroom as the “marketplace of ideas” also imply the cultivation of a critical perspective on received values.183 Political and
legal theorists discussing what it means for children to be autonomous similarly emphasize rational decisionmaking
skills.184 The psychology of choice in Supreme Court decisions

in these areas must be established before we can examine whether children of
various ages are capable of making ‘good’ decisions.”).
180. See supra Part I.B.
181. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 825 (1988).
182. See supra Part I.B.
183. See supra Part I.A.
184. See, e.g., ARCHARD, RIGHTS AND CHILDHOOD, supra note 3, at 93 (“The
capacity in question [regarding autonomy rights] is most frequently described
as that of rational autonomy.”); BLUSTEIN, supra note 47, at 135 (“To respect
autonomy is fundamentally to respect the capacity of an agent to rationally
determine for himself what he shall do and be.”); GUTMANN, supra note 53, at
30, 50 (explaining that education fosters “the intellectual skills necessary to
evaluate ways of life different from that of parents” and children must “also
develop capacities for criticism, rational argument, and decisionmaking by being taught how to think logically, to argue coherently and fairly, and to consider the relevant alternatives before coming to conclusions”); RAWLS, supra
note 8, at 209 (“We must choose for others as we have reason to believe they
would choose for themselves if they were at the age of reason and deciding rationally.”); Archard, Free Speech, supra note 4, at 91–93 (pointing out that critical habits of mind include the ability “to form consistent and stable beliefs,
and to appreciate the significance of options and their consequences”); Harry
Brighouse, Civic Education and Liberal Legitimacy, 108 ETHICS 719, 728
(1998) (“[T]he capacities involved in critical reflection help us to live autonomously.”); Emily Buss, The Adolescent’s Stake in the Allocation of Educational
Control Between Parent and State, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 1233, 1250 (2000)
(“[Some] theorists focus more specifically on the importance of children’s acquiring critical reasoning skills as a precondition for autonomy.”); John Eekelaar, The Emergence of Children’s Rights, 6 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 161, 171
(1986) (describing children’s right “to mature to a rationally autonomous
adulthood . . . capable of deciding on [their] own system of ends as free and rational beings” (quoting M.D.A. FREEMAN, THE RIGHTS AND WRONGS OF
CHILDREN 57 (1983))); Tamar Ezer, A Positive Right to Protection for Children,
7 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 1, 40 (2004) (“To become full citizens, children
must develop their capacity for rational choice and autonomous action.”); Tei-
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on children, as in the literature on children’s rights more generally, is decidedly cognition centered. But as psychologists and
legal theorists are beginning to understand, the skills of autonomous choice go well beyond cognition to encompass emotional
and imaginative skills as well. The next Part of this Article examines the psychological research showing that autonomous
decisionmaking involves a broad range of interrelated cognitive
and noncognitive capacities.
The Supreme Court’s cognition centered perspective on
choice has had significant adverse consequences for children’s
status in constitutional law. The cognitive model has reinforced
a division of labor between parents and schools, one that depicts parents as providing moral guidance and schools as fostering critical-thinking skills. But this division of labor has obscured the deep connection between family caregiving and the
skills of autonomous choice. The prevailing choice theory of
children’s socialization should be revised in light of research
identifying the central role of caregiving in the development of
the full range of skills needed for autonomous choice. This approach dismantles the traditional divide between home and
school to capture the deep interconnections between parental
and educational socialization processes.
The problem with a rational-choice framework for children’s rights, however, runs deeper. By assuming that autonomous decisionmaking skills are best cultivated in school,
choice theory fails to recognize the importance of what this Article calls “caregiving rights.” Educational rights as recognized
in current Supreme Court doctrine are certainly central to
children’s autonomy interests. But as described below, a core
set of caregiving rights fosters children’s developmental interests in maintaining ties to their primary caregivers, not only
because such ties serve children’s welfare interests but because
caregiving relationships are vital to children’s future autonomy
as well. Personal as well as citizenship interests are at stake in
the extension of children’s constitutional rights beyond education to the realm of family relationships.
In summary, the prevailing choice theory of children’s
rights fails in two ways. First, as a descriptive matter, the
theory fails to account for the ways in which children’s constitutional rights do not turn on children’s increasing capacity for
autonomous choice and do not serve an emancipating function.
telbaum, Children’s Rights, supra note 3, at 805 (describing “the capacity for
rational choice on which membership in liberal society is founded”).
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Upon close examination, it turns out that many constitutional
rights for children serve to socialize children in the skills of
adult autonomy. Choice theory fails to recognize the socializing
dimension in modern Supreme Court cases and its importance
to a framework for children’s future autonomy rights. Second,
choice theory remains wedded to an Enlightenment view of the
centrality of reason to human liberty and overlooks the nonrationalist, noncognitive dimensions of the choosing, autonomous
self. The theory has traditionally been tied to a rationalistic
psychology that fails to take sufficient account of the noncognitive attributes of decisionmaking and the family environment
that fosters them. The remainder of this Article presents an alternative theory of children’s rights in constitutional law that
overcomes the descriptive and psychological limitations of
choice theory while preserving choice theory’s normative commitment to the constitutional ideal of autonomy.
II. TOWARD A DEVELOPMENTAL THEORY OF
CHILDREN’S RIGHTS
The developmental theory of children’s constitutional
rights presented in this Part reinterprets existing Supreme
Court decisions on children’s rights from the perspective of
children’s development. Section A explains how the developmental theory presented here differs from the existing literature on children’s future rights as well as the literature on family caregiving. Section B presents the psychological research
supporting the developmental theory’s model of autonomous
decisionmaking. Drawing from research on decisionmaking,
this section describes the basic cognitive, emotional, and imaginative features of autonomous choice, and the way in which
caregiving relationships foster the development of these autonomy skills. Finally, section C elaborates on how the developmental theory of children’s rights supports children’s constitutional rights in the caregiving relationship. As explained here,
reconceiving the function and psychology of children’s rights
underscores the foundational role of family caregiving in the
development of children’s decisionmaking skills and the essential place of caregiving rights in the socialization process leading to adult autonomy.
The developmental theory views the capacity for autonomous decisionmaking as central to the concept of individual liberty in modern constitutional law. The history of constitutional
law is in large part a history of expanding citizenship rights to
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excluded groups, such as blacks and women. The developmental theory does not promote full citizenship rights for children,
obviously. But the theory offers a new framework for thinking
about children’s rights, one that conceives of rights as serving a
socializing as well as emancipating function in children’s lives.
This new framework grounds children’s rights in a notion of
their future autonomy, an approach that embraces rather than
represses the Supreme Court’s ambivalence over the status of
children as autonomous decisionmakers. From a developmental
perspective, children are on their way to becoming autonomous
adults, and children’s rights help to ensure that this developmental trajectory is successfully negotiated. Moreover, the
freedoms and rights of adult members of the constitutional polity depend on extending developmental rights to its youngest
members. Without overstating the case, it is the future of the
constitutional polity itself that turns on providing children with
developmental rights to the educational and caregiving services
they need to become autonomous adults and citizens.
A. DEVELOPMENTAL RIGHTS
The concept of developmental rights is related to the notion
of future rights found in the work of some political and legal
theorists. Future rights theorists generally focus on the child’s
potential for leading an autonomous life. John Eekelaar, for example, argues that children’s future rights should reflect the
idea that children’s “capacities are to be developed to their best
advantage.”185 Joel Feinberg identifies the child’s “rights-intrust” or “anticipatory autonomy rights,” which he defines as
the child’s right “to have . . . future options kept open until he
is a fully formed self-determining adult capable of deciding
among them.”186 Lee Teitelbaum advocates for “taking account
of the developmental nature of capacity in formulating a rights
theory.”187 What ties these future rights theories together is
185. Eekelaar, supra note 184, at 170.
186. Joel Feinberg, The Child’s Right to an Open Future, in WHOSE CHILD?
CHILDREN’S RIGHTS, PARENTAL AUTHORITY, AND STATE POWER 124, 125–26
(William Aiken & Hugh LaFollette eds., 1980).
187. Teitelbaum, Children’s Rights, supra note 3, at 822 (1999); see also
ARCHARD, RIGHTS AND CHILDHOOD, supra note 3, at 56 (describing some
rights “as protecting the future adults the children will become”); Campbell,
supra note 3, at 19 (discussing the “distinctively children’s interests and subsequent [future] rights which do relate to the rational capacities of adults,
namely the rights we ascribe to children in light of their future as adults”);
Garvey, supra note 13, at 1771–74 (detailing the interest in socializing chil-
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their focus on the rights children need to maximize their opportunity to acquire the skills of adult autonomy. The developmental theory presented in this Article shares with these theories a
vision of the importance of children’s rights in fostering the development of children’s future autonomy.
However, this Article goes beyond existing theories of
children’s future rights by identifying with specificity what autonomous choice entails psychologically. The term “autonomy”
is employed by theorists of children’s rights without very much
elaboration, often as if the concept were self-explanatory.
Sometimes what theorists mean by future rights is simply
children’s right to have their future options kept open.188 At
other times, theorists make reference to children realizing
“their full potential,” although what “potential” means is rarely
set out with any greater specificity.189 But the most common
meaning of autonomy in the cases and literature on children’s
rights is the capacity for rational choice. As discussed above,
both Supreme Court decisions and children’s rights theorists
emphasize critical thinking as the core component of the autonomy skills children must learn.190 Beyond passing references to
cognitive skills, however, the case law and existing literature
on children’s future rights fail to identify with any psychological depth the core attributes of autonomous choice.191
dren to become “mature adults capable of democratic self-government” and in
children’s future capacity for “self-realization”); Gutmann, supra note 176, at
349 (describing children’s rights “in virtue of their basic needs and interests as
future adult citizens”); Minow, What Ever Happened to Children’s Rights?, supra note 3, at 277 (“Advocates for children’s rights sometimes resolved the
tension between protection and liberation through a conception of children as
potential adults.”); Teitelbaum, Foreword, supra note 3, at 236 (discussing “integrative rights”).
188. See, e.g., Eekelaar, supra note 184, at 170 (noting that children’s
rights should “minimize the degree to which they enter adult life affected by
avoidable prejudices incurred during childhood”); Gutmann, supra note 176, at
352 (defining children’s future autonomy as, in the abstract, the ability “for
choosing unprejudicially among all conceivable conceptions of the good life”).
189. One theorist does specify what “potential” means. See Minow, What
Ever Happened to Children’s Rights?, supra note 3, at 296 (“[T]he Convention
calls for developmental rights—rights to education, cultural activities, play
and leisure, and freedom of thought—to meet children’s needs in reaching
their full potential.”).
190. See supra Part I.A–B.
191. Barbara Woodhouse is an important exception, and this Article builds
on her work. WOODHOUSE, HIDDEN IN PLAIN SIGHT, supra note 3, at 28 (“A
developmental perspective is foundational to a theory of children’s rights.”).
Woodhouse provides a rich analysis of children’s needs and capacities at different stages of development. Id. at 18–28 (discussing the work of Piaget,
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The developmental theory presented in this Part fills this
gap in the literature on children’s future rights by specifying
the cognitive and noncognitive skills that children ideally will
possess as adult decisionmakers. In recent decades, liberal
theorists interested in children’s education have tried to identify in detail the qualities associated with adult liberal citizenship, such as law abidingness, tolerance, and independent
thinking. Without taking a position on what those broader
qualities might be, this Article focuses only on the attributes of
mind associated with the capacity for autonomous decisionmaking. The following section describes in detail how psychological
research on decisionmaking confirms the centrality of cognitive,
emotional, and imaginative capacities to adult choice. A deeper
understanding of the psychology of choice leads to a more
nuanced understanding of the importance of early family relationships to the development of these capacities. Early caregiving relationships are central to the unfolding of the cognitive,
emotional, and imaginative processes essential to choice.
Schools obviously have an important role to play in the development of critical thinking. Schools may also play a vital role in
cultivating values such as tolerance and civility. It is possible
as well that schools do and should have a caregiving role in the
lives of children. But schools must build upon a caregiving
foundation already laid down. For these reasons, children’s
rights to education—already protected under all fifty state constitutions as well as the Equal Protection Clause of the Federal
Constitution—are essential but not enough. The focus of the
rest of this Article is on children’s fundamental rights in the
caregiving relationship.

Erikson, Bronfenbrenner, Elder, and Coles). She argues for the recognition of
both children’s needs-based and capacity-based rights, with the latter focused
on recognizing children’s fundamental right to be heard. Id. at 38 (“Looking at
children’s agency through the lens of needs-based and capacity-based rights,
children should be able to exercise their capacities to speak and act within a
framework that acknowledges their stage on the road to adulthood.”). Emily
Buss also incorporates developmental psychology into her theory of children’s
constitutional rights, focusing on the development of cognitive thinking, moral
reasoning, and sociocognitive and identity development. Buss, supra note 4, at
355–58. Buss’s approach, which focuses on broader developmental processes
such as identity formation, is an important contribution to the literature, and
moves us closer to a full developmental account of adult autonomy. Id. at 358–
62. However, her description of autonomy is largely limited to an analysis of
cognitive development. See id. at 358–59 (“The capacity for logical thinking
has most relevance for the exercise of autonomy rights, which reflect our faith
in individuals’ competence to assess their own interests.”).
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The developmental theory supplements contemporary
caregiving theories in two important ways. First, the developmental theory embraces rather than rejects the liberal value of
individual autonomy. Family law scholars, such as Martha
Fineman, have long insisted on the importance of caregiving
but they take the position that caregiving values are incompatible with a liberal regime.192 In these scholars’ views, support
for caregiving can only take place within a nonliberal legal
framework oriented around an ethic of care, civil society values,
or communitarian ideals.193 In contrast, this Article argues that
the constitutional ideal of individual autonomy and a commitment to caregiving values are not inherently antithetical.
Second, the theory of children’s caregiving rights presented
here focuses on the psychological dimension of children’s development. This approach differs from the important work of scholars such as Robin West, who also take a liberal perspective but
focus primarily on the rights of caregivers to engage in caregiv-

192. FINEMAN, supra note 166, at 70; see also Mary Becker, Patriarchy and
Inequality: Towards a Substantive Feminism, 1999 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 21, 22
(calling liberal feminism “empty at [its] core”); Martha Fineman, Dominant
Discourse, Professional Language, and Legal Change in Child Custody Decisionmaking, 101 HARV. L. REV. 727, 768 (1988) (“[M]others’ desire[s] . . . are
incompatible with the symbolic presentation of equality by liberal mainstream
feminism.”); Kathryn L. Powers, Sex Segregation and the Ambivalent Directions of Sex Discrimination Law, 1979 WIS. L. REV. 55, 56 (rejecting an “individualistic perspective” of law that “focuses narrowly on equality of formal legal rights and opportunities” and promoting instead a “participatory
perspective” that endorses “the equal participation of women and men in all
social activities”).
193. See, e.g., MCCLAIN, supra note 166, at 110 (arguing for the necessity of
a new social contract that recognizes and supports caregiving as a “public value . . . [that] build[s] upon and reinforce[s] a definition of personal responsibility that does not define it solely in terms of market labor but affirms the value
of care work as a component of social reproduction”); Katharine T. Bartlett,
Re-Expressing Parenthood, 98 YALE L.J. 293, 304 –05 (1988) (arguing in favor
of a process of “community norm-building about what it means to be a parent”
in the place of the “focus on the rights of individuals”); Katharine T. Bartlett &
Carol B. Stack, Joint Custody, Feminism and the Dependency Dilemma, 2
BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 9, 34 (1986) (advocating for a society that promotes
the “moral imperative of nurturing responsibility for children, not a set of
‘rights’ that can be earned (or declined)”); Becker, supra note 192, at 49 (“[T]he
need to value caretaking and relationships, particularly with dependents, will
be high on a relational feminism agenda, and might not even appear on a formal equality or anti-subordination agenda.”); Martha Albertson Fineman, The
Vulnerable Subject: Anchoring Equality in the Human Condition, 20 YALE J.L.
& FEMINISM 1, 19 (2008) (contending that a proper treatment of the problem of
caretaking will require “[r]eplacing the [idea of the] liberal subject with [the
idea of the] vulnerable subject”).
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ing work without social or economic penalty.194 Their work examines the social meaning of caregiving with the goal of establishing the equality rights of caregivers. The theory of children’s caregiving rights presented here is not intended to
displace the valuable work being done by feminist liberal scholars, but supplements that work by focusing on the psychological meaning of caregiving and establishing the developmental
rights of children.195
The concept of children’s caregiving rights does not exclude
the possibility that older children possess autonomy rights. As
described in Part I, some important Supreme Court cases do
recognize older children’s capacity for self-determination, particularly in the context of reproductive choice. The developmental theory of children’s rights does not reject the recognition of
autonomy rights for that class of children claiming rights based
on their mature capacity for decisionmaking. However, the distinction between autonomy and developmental rights should
not be overstated. It is true that children’s autonomy rights
rest on children’s claim to being treated the same as adults
while developmental rights rest on their claim to special treatment based on their inherent difference from adults. But what
this surface distinction obscures is a deeper connection between
children’s autonomy rights and their future rights, and the
emancipating and socialization functions that these rights
serve. Put simply, future rights are a precondition to the future
enjoyment of autonomy rights and are directed to ensuring that
children become adult, autonomous, rights-holding citizens.
And conversely, children’s autonomy rights are always defined
by reference to children’s developmental maturity. Despite obvious differences, autonomy rights and developmental rights

194. See Robin West, Re-Imagining Justice, 14 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 333,
343 (2002) (“We need rights that protect our ability . . . to care for the young,
and bring them to responsible maturity. . . . We need those rights to valorize
and honor this fundamental aspect of our being.”); see also ANNE L. ALSTOTT,
NO EXIT: WHAT PARENTS OWE THEIR CHILDREN AND WHAT SOCIETY OWES
PARENTS 15–20 (2004) [hereinafter ALSTOTT, NO EXIT] (discussing the realities parents face in providing continuity of care to children); Anne L. Alstott,
What Does a Fair Society Owe Children—and Their Parents?, 72 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1941, 1977–78 (2004) (“Every child deserves the parental care she needs
to develop her autonomy and take her place in adult life, but every parent deserves the chance to provide that care while leading a life of her own.”).
195. Anne Alstott has done important, related work on what a liberal society owes children. See Alstott, supra note 8, at 1–2.
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both turn on the question of children’s developmental capacities
and achievements.196
The question of children’s affirmative entitlements to essential caregiving services raises a final conceptual issue concerning the relationship of developmental rights to classic welfare rights. The welfare theory of rights defines children’s
rights in terms of the protection of children’s fundamental interests.197 Developmental rights can be distinguished on their
face from children’s welfare rights to the extent the latter focus
on the protection of children’s present needs as opposed to their
future capacities.198 While this conceptual distinction—present
versus future interests—has a logical appeal, the fact is that
many of children’s important present interests such as food and
health are also essential to their development into autonomous
adults. Moreover, welfare rights by definition provide children
with positive claims to fundamental social goods. Future rights,
on the other hand, encompass negative rights to protection of
certain kinds of activities and relationships as well as affirmative rights to the social goods related to their future interests.
The extent to which developmental rights to affirmative
goods—which would encompass many traditional welfare
rights—can and should be recognized as constitutional entitlements is addressed in the final section of this Article.
B. CHILDREN’S FUTURE AUTONOMY
1. The Psychology of Choice
Upon first consideration, it may come as no surprise that
choice theory has traditionally equated autonomous choice with
cognitive thinking. The idea of cognition is commonly associated with concepts such as intellect, critical inquiry, rationality, and reason. While each of these terms emphasizes slightly
different aspects of decisionmaking, they all suggest mental ac196. See WOODHOUSE, HIDDEN IN PLAIN SIGHT, supra note 3, at 43 (arguing that autonomy and dependence are “two sides of the same coin”); Ezer,
supra note 184, at 39 (noting that children’s rights “flow from both their dependency and developing autonomy”). As discussed above in Part I.A.2, children’s First Amendment rights in school can serve both socializing and emancipating functions at the same time. As described earlier, the Tinker court
viewed the free speech right in that case as protecting children’s freedom of
expression at the same time that it served to train young children in the ways
of democratic life. See supra Part I.A.2.
197. See supra Part I.C.
198. See, e.g., Feinberg, supra note 186, at 126.
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tivities relating to believing, perceiving, analyzing, and logical
thinking, and they generally exclude such qualities as emotions, intuitions, and fantasies.199 Common sense supports the
idea that to be self-governing is to think cognitively rather than
to be swept away by emotion or fantasy. As with most psychological issues, however, common sense may not be the best
guide. Psychological research suggests that the skills of individual decisionmaking are much broader than mere intellect
alone.200
Choice theory’s emphasis on cognition has been reinforced
in recent years by legal scholars doing work on individual decisionmaking in law.201 These scholars have turned to research in
cognitive psychology in an effort to understand better the psychological mechanisms of individual choice. They draw on experimental research that identifies particular cognitive biases,
heuristics, and frameworks that are shown to adversely affect
individual decisionmaking.202 Legal scholars have also utilized
cognitive research supporting the existence of unconscious cognitive processes that govern individual decisionmaking in unseen ways. Mental scripts or prototypes acquired in childhood
have also been studied for their effect on adolescent decisionmaking.203 The stated goal of this behavioral legal scholarship
is to enable courts and legal policymakers to design laws that
will help to improve the cognitive processes of choice so that individual decisions are, in the words of behavioral scholars,
more rational.204
199. The field of cognitive psychology reflects a view of the human mind as
operating according to structure, rules, and plans, much like the software of a
computer processing system. See HOWARD SHEVRIN ET AL., CONSCIOUS AND
UNCONSCIOUS PROCESSES: PSYCHODYNAMIC, COGNITIVE, AND NEUROPHYSIOLOGICAL CONVERGENCES 51 (1996). Cognitive research studies how the mind
processes information in order to understand “the kinds of information we have
in our memories, and the processes involved in acquiring, retaining and using
that information.” MICHAEL G. WESSELLS, COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY 1–2 (1982).
200. See Anne C. Dailey, Imagination and Choice, 35 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY
175, 175–80 (2010).
201. See Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1476–79 (1998).
202. See generally JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND
BIASES (Daniel Kahnman et al. eds., 1982) (discussing how cognitive biases
and heuristics affect individual decisionmaking).
203. Richard E. Redding, Juveniles Transferred to Criminal Court: Legal
Reform Proposals Based on Social Science Research, 1997 UTAH L. REV. 709,
723–33.
204. See, e.g., Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism
Seriously: Some Evidence of Market Manipulation, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1420,

2011]

CHILDREN’S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS

2151

This current legal scholarship on individual decisionmaking strongly reinforces the prevailing view that individual
choice is primarily—and ideally—a cognitive activity. When
scholars discuss the kinds of critical-thinking skills essential to
autonomous choice, they generally mean to emphasize a range
of mental activities that include rational thinking but exclude
emotions. Traditionally, to think emotionally or to act upon
emotions is taken as an indication of the failure of autonomous
choice. Emotions have long been deemed incompatible with the
mature exercise of autonomous choice and deliberative selfgovernment. The Federalist Papers emphasized that the new
constitutional government would operate to contain the passions of the majority.205 Similarly, early in the twentieth century, the Supreme Court expressed its concern that a strong
reading of the First Amendment would help to incite the unruly
passions of the crowd.206 The reasonable person and the rational actor embody a well-known view of law as the domain of reason. Juries are instructed not to make decisions based on sympathy. The achievement of emotional self-mastery—that is,
emotions under the control of the intellect—is central to the
prevailing legal understanding of individual decisionmaking.
Yet the notion of emotional self-mastery does not suffice as
a full portrait of the role of emotions in individual decisionmaking.207 Although emotions can lead to “hot cognition” and thus
adversely affect judgment, experimental research in the field

1425 (1999); Jolls et al., supra note 201, at 1508–10; Linda Hamilton Krieger,
The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination
and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1165–66 (1995);
Donald C. Langevoort, Organized Illusions: A Behavioral Theory of Why Corporations Mislead Stock Market Investors (and Cause Other Social Harms),
146 U. PA. L. REV. 101, 171–72 (1997). For similar discussions in the popular
press about individual decisionmaking, see generally DAN ARIELY,
PREDICTABLY IRRATIONAL: THE HIDDEN FORCES THAT SHAPE OUR DECISIONS
(2008), and RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING
DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS (2008). For a review of
both books, see generally Anne C. Dailey & Peter Siegelman, Predictions and
Nudges: What Behavioral Economics Has to Offer the Humanities, and ViceVersa, 21 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 341 (2009) (book review).
205. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison).
206. Geoffrey R. Stone, Civil Liberties in Wartime, 28 J. SUPREME CT. HIST.
215, 228 (2003).
207. For a collection of essays addressing the topic of emotions in law, see
generally THE PASSIONS OF LAW (Susan Bandes ed., 1999), and Terry A. Maroney, Law and Emotion: A Proposed Taxonomy of an Emerging Field, 30 LAW
& HUM. BEHAV. 119 (2006).
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yields the conclusion that emotions are not all bad.208 Emotional self-mastery requires disciplining one’s emotions as well as
affirmatively utilizing emotional skills to understand and evaluate both oneself and the world. Studies have been carried out
which show that in some circumstances emotions can facilitate
reasoned thinking. For example, emotions can operate as fast,
intuitive guides to an outcome that would otherwise have taken
long deliberation.209 And some emotions, like empathy, actually
improve decisionmaking by broadening the scope of information
available to the individual.210 Information obtained through
emotional responses to a situation is often some of the most
valuable information needed for making important decisions.
Indeed, the absence of emotion—an affectless mental state—
would exclude critical information from the decisionmaking
process.211 Psychological research thus confirms the Romantic
insight that emotional experience serves to deepen and expand
knowledge about oneself and the world.
Broadening the traditional account of autonomous choice to
include emotional self-mastery in the full sense of the term is
essential, but emotions and cognition are not the only psychological features central to adult decisionmaking. Largely overlooked but no less important is the role of imagination in individual decisionmaking.212 Because conceiving of alternatives to
the present state of affairs is a necessary component of decisionmaking, imagination is what, in part, makes autonomous
choice possible. At the most fundamental level, imagination vitally facilitates the process by which individuals generate the
alternatives which make choice possible. Imagination operates
cognitively in some respects, as when an individual puts his or
her wishes, needs, and desires into words. But imagination also
208. Dailey, supra note 200, at 184; see ANTONIO R. DAMASIO, DESCARTES’
ERROR: EMOTION, REASON, AND THE HUMAN BRAIN 191–96 (1994); George
Loewenstein & Jennifer S. Lerner, The Role of Affect in Decision Making, in
HANDBOOK OF AFFECTIVE SCIENCES 619, 619–20 (Richard J. Davidson et al.
eds., 2003); Martha C. Nussbaum, Emotion in the Language of Judging, 70 ST.
JOHN’S L. REV. 23, 25 (1996).
209. See TIMOTHY D. WILSON, STRANGERS TO OURSELVES: DISCOVERING THE
ADAPTIVE UNCONSCIOUS 50 (2002); Jennifer S. Lerner & Larissa Z. Tiedens,
Portrait of the Angry Decision Maker: How Appraisal Tendencies Shape Anger’s Influence on Cognition, 19 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 115, 132 (2006).
210. See NUSSBAUM, supra note 78, at 66; Dailey, supra note 200, at 185–86.
211. Impairment in emotional interrelatedness is one of the criterion for
diagnosis along the autism spectrum. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC
AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 75 (4th ed. 2000).
212. See Dailey, supra note 200, at 187–92.
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involves the kind of wishing, needing, and desiring associated
with nonverbal states of fantasy and creativity.213
Every act of choice involves to some extent the creative act
of producing the alternatives under consideration. Obviously,
alternatives originate to some degree from outside the self as,
for example, in the decision whether to attend college or
whether to marry. This is why traditional liberalism places
such a heavy emphasis on exposure. But exposure alone cannot
explain why particular alternatives present themselves as possible choices to the individual. At some level, alternatives themselves are “chosen” in the sense that their emergence as alternatives is driven by deeply felt, sometimes unconscious wishes,
needs, and desires. The process of producing alternatives to the
current state of affairs is thus a creative process that draws on
the particular individual’s unique imaginings about the self
and his or her place in the world.
The skills of imagination include the capacity for reality
testing, which involves mediating between conscious, rational
beliefs, wishes, and perceptions, on the one hand, and conscious
and unconscious imaginings, on the other.214 Reality testing is
a more complex skill than might be thought at first. Even for
adults, a clear line between fantasy and reality can sometimes
be difficult to maintain, particularly under periods of emotional
stress. For example, a fight with a significant other can lead to
unrealistic fantasies of abandonment, or the loss of a job can
lead to unreal fears of financial ruin. In addition, everyday understandings of the world require imagining what other people
are thinking, feeling, or perceiving. Empathy, for example, is a
process drawing on our powers for imaging what other people
are feeling and experiencing. The capacity to imagine what
others are feeling and thinking implicates the skills of reality
testing. For example, transitory moments of paranoia can happen to anyone as concerns about the intent of others become
temporarily unrealistic, usually under strong emotional pressure. Our wishes, needs, and desires both give meaning to our
experience of the world but can also distort the actual state of
affairs. Mature decisionmaking thus includes the skill of reality
testing which allows an individual to discern the difference between the two.

213. Id. at 178.
214. Id. at 180–83.
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Reality testing is present in any context where future options are being considered, for individuals must assess how realistic the particular alternatives are by imagining what the options will bring.215 This process of assessment is partly a
straightforward consideration of probabilities, but it also includes imagining how people will behave, what they will think,
how circumstances will feel, what intangible rewards there will
be, and a range of other factors not easily reducible to costbenefit ratios or probabilistic tables.216 Some interesting empirical research is beginning to be done on the mistakes individuals make in imagining how they will feel if certain events were
to happen, and it turns out that individuals are not very good
at getting it exactly right.217
Imagination also informs the process of introspection to the
extent individuals must discover and reflect on the alternatives
that make choice possible. Prevailing views about autonomy often, but not always, emphasize the skills of critical selfinsight.218 To the extent self-insight is a factor in autonomous
decisionmaking, it is important to note that introspection is not
as easy a skill to master as might commonly be thought. Identifying possible alternatives is hard enough, but understanding
why they present themselves as alternatives is even more complex.219 Moreover, imagined alternatives can be unconsciously
215. Id. at 189.
216. Id.
217. See, e.g., RICHARD LAYNARD, HAPPINESS: LESSONS FROM A NEW
SCIENCE 3–4 (2005).
218. See BLUSTEIN, supra note 47, at 132 (contending that autonomy is “a
self-critical ability”); MACEDO, LIBERAL VIRTUES, supra note 12, at 216 (defining autonomy in terms of “the development of the capacity critically to assess
and even actively shape not simply one’s actions, but one’s character itself ”);
Meira Levinson, Liberalism, Pluralism, and Political Education: Paradox or
Paradigm?, 25 OXFORD REV. EDUC. 39, 50 (1999) (defining autonomy “as the
capacity self-critically to evaluate one’s values and ends with the possibility of
revising and then realising them”); Frank L. Michelman, Foreword: Traces of
Self-Government, 100 HARV. L. REV. 4, 25–27 (1986) (describing the Kantian
concept of freedom as involving both will and self-knowledge). But see
GALSTON, supra note 78, at 254 (arguing that “liberal freedom entails the
right to live unexamined as well as examined lives”).
219. The communitarian philosopher Michael Sandel describes this process
in “cognitive” terms, although his description comes close to a psychoanalytic
model:
For a subject to play a role in shaping the contours of its identity requires a certain faculty of reflection. Will alone is not enough. What is
required is a certain capacity for self-knowledge, a capacity for what
we have called agency in the cognitive sense . . . . [T]he capacity for
reflection enables the self to turn its lights inward upon itself, to in-
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repressed for a variety of reasons, such as guilt or anger. Critical self-awareness of the wishes, needs, and beliefs that give
rise to available alternatives rests on the capacity for imaginative contemplation of what one’s own internal motivations
might be.
The skills of autonomous choice thus go well beyond the
traditional focus on critical thinking. As discussed above, autonomous choice involves a complex interplay among cognitive decisionmaking skills, emotional self-regulation, and imagination.
These interrelated processes of cognition, emotion, and imagination come together to make autonomous choice possible. The
following section sets out the importance of family caregiving to
the socialization process by which these cognitive and noncognitive skills of choice develop.
2. Children’s Socialization Revisited
By broadening our understanding of the psychology of
choice, the developmental theory leads to a reconsideration of
the process by which children are socialized into adulthood. The
developmental research shows that the capacity for autonomous choice does not evolve from intrinsic maturational forces
alone but depends, in the first instance, on the interplay between innate biological factors and the early caregiving environment.220 The diverse skills of autonomous choice begin to
develop in the earliest relationship with a caregiving figure and

quire into its constituent nature, to survey its various attachments
and acknowledge their respective claims, to sort out the bounds—now
expansive, now constrained—between the self and the other, to arrive
at a self-understanding less opaque if never perfectly transparent, a
subjectivity less fluid if never finally fixed, and so gradually, throughout a lifetime, to participate in the constitution of its identity.
MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE 152–53 (1982).
220. See Steven Marans & Donald J. Cohen, Child Psychoanalytic Theories
of Development, in CHILD AND ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY: A COMPREHENSIVE
TEXTBOOK 129, 129 (Melvin Lewis ed., 1991); see also Martha Minow, Interpreting Rights: An Essay for Robert Cover, 96 YALE L.J. 1860, 1883 (1987) (“Recent theories of human development emphasize how aspects of the self develop
from experiences with others, notably the mothers, such that ‘the core of the
self, or self-feeling is also constructed relationally.’” (quoting Nancy Julia Chodorow, Toward a Relational Individualism: The Mediation of Self Through
Psychoanalysis, in RECONSTRUCTING INDIVIDUALISM: AUTONOMY, INDIVIDUALITY, AND THE SELF IN WESTERN THOUGHT 197, 201 (Thomas Heller et al.
eds., 1986))). For an elaboration of the ideas in this and the following paragraphs, see Dailey, supra note 50, at 462–68.
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involve the complex unfolding of cognitive, emotional, and imaginative processes.221
First, with respect to cognitive development, the neuroscientific, cognitive, and attachment research show that early
caregiving sets in motion the development of the mental apparatus necessary for higher cognitive skills.222 Researchers are
in agreement that “experiences in the first year or two of life
are particularly formative: they establish the fundamentals of
language and cognitive functioning.”223 These findings are
found in naturalistic settings, which show that “high-quality
care during the infant and toddler years is generally associated
with better cognitive functioning, complex play, and language
development.”224 The economist James Heckman and his colleagues describe the connection between caregiving and cognitive development:
The effects of early experience on perceptual and cognitive skills have
been studied extensively by neuroscientists . . . . Complex cognitive
capacities, which mature and change throughout our lifetimes, depend on the analytic, synthetic, and recognition capabilities of specific
neural circuits. The properties of many of these brain circuits have
been shown to be particularly sensitive to the shaping influences of
experience during early life.225

221. For decades, family law theorists have written about the importance
of the early caregiving relationship to children’s psychological well-being.
Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit were the first and most influential family law
scholars to write about the child’s basic need for attachment. See JOSEPH
GOLDSTEIN, ANNA FREUD & ALBERT SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF
THE CHILD 7 (1973); see also JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN, ANNA FREUD & ALBERT
SOLNIT, BEFORE THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 8 (1979); JOSEPH
GOLDSTEIN, ANNA FREUD, ALBERT SOLNIT & SONJA GOLDSTEIN, IN THE BEST
INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 4 (1986).
222. See MARY GAUVAIN, THE SOCIAL CONTEXT OF COGNITIVE
DEVELOPMENT 30–31 (2001); James E. Ryan, A Constitutional Right to Preschool?, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 49, 64–65 (2006) (showing that brain research shows
significant cognitive development between infancy and three years of age).
223. Nat’l Inst. of Child Health Human Dev. Early Child Care Research
Network, The Relation of Child Care to Cognitive and Language Development,
71 CHILD DEV. 960, 961 (2000) [hereinafter NICHD]; see also Peter Fonagy &
Mary Target, Attachment, Trauma and Psychoanalysis: Where Psychoanalysis
Meets Neuroscience, in MIND TO MIND: INFANT RESEARCH, NEUROSCIENCE,
AND PSYCHOANALYSIS 15, 23–25 (Elliot J. Jurist et al. eds., 2008) (describing
the “evolution of the social brain”); Eric R. Kandel, Biology and the Future of
Psychoanalysis: A New Intellectual Framework for Psychiatry Revisited, 156
AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 505, 512–13 (1999).
224. NICHD, supra note 223, at 961.
225. Eric I. Knudsen et al., Economic, Neurobiological and Behavioral
Perspectives on Building America’s Future Workforce 8–9 (IZA Discussion Paper, Paper No. 2190, 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=919962.

2011]

CHILDREN’S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS

2157

Through repeated interactions with primary caregivers,
the infant learns to create internal representations associated
with the presence of these figures,226 representations which are
the basis for the development of internal schemas or prototypes.227 These internal schemas or prototypes are established
early in life and provide the stability and structure necessary
for adult cognitive functioning. Research has also shown that
maternal speech patterns “predict vocabulary growth during
the first years of life . . . as well as prekindergarten measures of
emergent literacy and print-related skills.”228 As legal scholar
James Ryan reports, “Advances in neuroscience have made it
clear that the first few years of life are crucial for cognitive development and that early experiences can influence the emerging architecture of the brain.”229 At all levels of cognitive development—structural, analytic, and linguistic—research shows
that early caregiving plays a formative role. When early caregiving is not good enough—for example, when the early caregiving environment is one of severe emotional deprivation or
neglect—the child’s future capacity for perceiving and thinking
about the world in an adaptive, undistorted way is likely to be
impaired.230
The early caregiving relationship is also central to the
adult capacity for emotional self-regulation. Common sense
tells us that parental discipline is important to the child’s development of emotional self-regulatory mechanisms. But the
role of parents as affirming, nonprohibitory figures in the very
early years plays a primary role in establishing the psychological and physiological processes of emotional self-regulation and
integration.231 At first, the external presence of an emotionally
attuned caregiver helps the infant to diminish physiological
226. See PHYLLIS TYSON & ROBERT L. TYSON, PSYCHOANALYTIC THEORIES
DEVELOPMENT: AN INTEGRATION 93 (1990); Sidney J. Blatt & Rebecca
Smith Behrends, Internalization, Separation-Individuation, and the Nature of
Therapeutic Action, 68 INT’L J. PSYCHOANALYSIS 279, 283–84 (1987); Dailey,
supra note 50, at 463–64; Linda C. Mayes & Donald J. Cohen, The Development of a Capacity for Imagination in Early Childhood, 47 PSYCHOANALYTIC
STUDY OF THE CHILD 23, 29 (1992).
227. See Kandel, supra note 223, at 512–13.
228. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, FROM NEURONS TO NEIGHBORHOODS: THE
SCIENCE OF EARLY CHILDHOOD DEVELOPMENT 246 (Jack P. Shonkoff & Deborah A. Phillips eds., 2000).
229. See Ryan, supra note 222, at 50.
230. See PETER FONAGY ET AL., AFFECT REGULATION, MENTALIZATION, AND
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SELF 33 (2004); Dailey, supra note 50, at 464 –65.
231. See ACKERMAN, supra note 8, at 149; Dailey, supra note 50, at 465.
OF
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and later emotional tensions.232 Through repeated interactions,
the infant creates internal representations associated with the
presence of the caregiver. In the normal course of development,
the child learns to call up these internal representations of a
soothing caregiving relationship to help moderate and contain
strong emotions.233 At a physiological level, research on animals shows that high levels of stress, such as that which might
be experienced by infants in the absence of a good-enough caregiver, impair the development of cortisol neuromodulators that
control physiological arousal.234 Similarly, attachment studies
have shown “[h]igh levels of negative affectivity, emotional outbursts, [and] inattentiveness” among children whose caregivers
failed to provide a minimally responsive environment.235 In this
way, emotional self-mastery evolves as a developmental
achievement with its roots in the affirming and containing aspects of a good-enough caregiving relationship.
Finally, the skills of imagination also begin in the earliest
interaction with important caregivers. This fact of children’s
development is often overlooked in the legal literature, which
instead emphasizes children’s exposure to diverse viewpoints in
school as a primary route for the development of imagination.
It is certainly true that exposure to alternative ways of life is
necessary for children to develop a sense that choice is possible.
These diverse viewpoints are presented through books and instruction as well as by exposure to other children or to the
broader social environment. But while it is true that exposure
is essential to imaginative activity, school-age children’s exposure to diverse viewpoints is only part of what is needed to
equip children with imaginative capacities. Although exposure
to diverse viewpoints fuels the imagination, and can instill in
children the knowledge that alternative ways of life exist, the
process of imagining also requires particular mental skills developed in the early childhood years.236
As discussed above, the mental schemas and prototypes
laid down early in life can affect the individual’s perception of
the world, but they also affect the content of the individual’s
232. See Dailey, supra note 50, at 465.
233. See Blatt & Behrends, supra note 226, at 283–84; Mayes & Cohen, supra note 226, at 29.
234. See PETER FONAGY, ATTACHMENT THEORY AND PSYCHOANALYSIS 37
(2001).
235. See id. at 42.
236. See PAUL HARRIS, THE WORK OF THE IMAGINATION 27–28 (2000).
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imaginings. An individual whose early experience was one of
severe deprivation or neglect is more likely to perceive the
world in disappointing or depriving ways than an individual
whose early caregiving experience was affirming.237 Even more
fundamentally, by engaging in pretend play with caregivers,
children learn to master the process of reality testing that is so
important to adult decisionmaking.238 Using one’s imagination
to interpret other people and the world is a necessary skill that
every young child must learn to master.239 As developmental
psychologists are beginning to discover, the emergence of imaginative thinking in young children is “linked with a move toward objectivity rather than away from it.”240 In experimental
work with children, researchers have measured children’s ability to imagine what goes on in other people’s minds, a skill
called mentalization.241 Children learn the fundamental distinction between fantasy and reality, and to utilize their imagination in ways that give meaning to the external world,
through the earliest interactions with a responsive caregiver.242
Early caregiving need not be perfect, or even necessarily
good, to foster the development of cognitive thinking, emotional
self-mastery, and strong reality-testing skills. It need only be
“good enough.”243 Good-enough caregiving is caregiving sufficient to set in motion the development of these basic psychological skills. It arises from a stable, continuous, emotionally responsive relationship between a child and one or more adult
237. See Dailey, supra note 50, at 464.
238. See HARRIS, supra note 236, at 28; D.W. WINNICOTT, PLAYING AND
REALITY 12–13 (1971).
239. See Robert N. Emde & Joann Robinson, Guiding Principles for a
Theory of Early Intervention: A Developmental-Psychoanalytic Perspective, in
HANDBOOK OF EARLY CHILDHOOD INTERVENTION 160, 174 –75 (Jack P. Shonkoff & Samuel J. Meisels eds., 2d ed. 2000).
240. HARRIS, supra note 236, at 6–7 (emphasis added).
241. See FONAGY ET AL., supra note 230, at 210.
242. While genetic variation and cultural environment play an important
part in children developing imaginative skills, researchers believe it likely
“that many children, particularly under conditions of environmental deprivation and stress, show less of such abilities.” Emde & Robinson, supra note 239,
at 175; Mayes & Cohen, supra note 226, at 41 (“It is not only the blurring of
the distinction between pretend and real but also the failure to imagine others’
feelings, beliefs and wishes that mark [autism and related developmental disorders] as examples of the failure to develop an imaginative capacity that supports ongoing social differentiation.”).
243. Cf. D.W. WINNICOTT, THE MATURATIONAL PROCESS AND THE
FACILITATING ENVIRONMENT 145–48 (1965) (comparing the “good-enough”
mother with the “not good-enough” mother).
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caregivers.244 A good-enough standard of caregiving does not
strive for an unrealistic ideal of childrearing. The standard reflects the fact that childrearing is imbedded in the imperfect
realm of human relationships and necessarily characterized by
quite ordinary successes and failures. A good-enough caregiving relationship is easily established in the average family
where minor deprivations and frustrations are expected to occur. Indeed, minor failures in caregiving are considered essential to stimulate the child to develop higher-order mental
processes.245 Because good-enough caregiving unfolds over the
course of countless interactions, even serious deprivations may
not have adverse developmental consequences in the particular
case.246 Moreover, some children exhibit unusual resilience in
the face of even profound failures in caregiving, and experiences later in life can sometimes compensate for early deprivations.247
Understanding the family’s role in the development of autonomy skills means fundamentally revising the prevailing
constitutional theory of children’s socialization. As discussed
above, choice theory generally assumes that parents first socialize children into a particular way of life, and then schools
give children the cognitive tools and alternative views they will
need as adults to choose whether to accept or reject the parents’
way of life as their own. However, this division of labor between
families and schools overlooks the central role of family caregiving to the cultivation of the cognitive and noncognitive skills
of choice. Families and schools are not autonomous realms of
activity. Parents and schools both contribute to the development of children’s autonomy skills. For example, research confirms that, by almost every measure, children exposed to a stable, emotionally responsive caregiving environment do better in
school.248 Caregiving is important not only in its own right, but
244. See generally MARGARET S. MAHLER ET AL., THE PSYCHOLOGICAL
BIRTH OF THE HUMAN INFANT (1975) (describing how a responsive relationship
with adult caregivers is necessary to normal separation and individuation);
DANIEL N. STERN, THE INTERPERSONAL WORLD OF THE INFANT: A VIEW FROM
PSYCHOANALYSIS AND DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY (1st paperback ed. 2000)
(outlining the infant to caregiver bond in human development).
245. Blatt & Behrends, supra note 233, at 283.
246. See id.
247. See, e.g., FONAGY, supra note 234, at 28–30.
248. See, e.g., Alstott, supra note 8, at 8 (noting that empirical evidence
“documents that family background matters for children’s life chances”). Some
of the best work in this area has to do with early intervention programs into
disadvantaged families. Early intervention in the lives of poor children likely

2011]

CHILDREN’S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS

2161

also because early caregiving more than any other factor determines the course of children’s educational outcomes and, as
a consequence, their adult capacities and potentials.
C. RIGHTS IN THE CAREGIVING RELATIONSHIP
The developmental theory highlights the importance of
caregiving rights to children’s socialization into autonomous
adults. As explained in this section, children’s constitutional
rights in the caregiving relationship take three main forms.
First, children have rights under the Due Process Clause to be
free from state interference with established primary caregiving relationships. Second, children’s interests in caregiving are
also protected under other constitutional provisions where the
challenged state action touches upon these developmental interests. Third, and most far-reaching, children have affirmative
constitutional claims to a minimum level of family caregiving
services. Each of these three types of caregiving rights is addressed in turn.
From the perspective of choice theory, parental rights are
the proper vehicle for protecting children’s interest in establishing and maintaining secure caregiving relationships.249 A developmental perspective on children’s caregiving relationships,
however, highlights the problem with a constitutional approach
that relies exclusively on parental rights. Under current doctrine, children have no independent constitutionally protected
has positive effects in part because the intervention supports and improves
existing caregiving relationships. See W. Steven Barnett, Benefit-Cost Analysis
of the Perry Preschool Program and Its Policy Implications, 7 EDUC.
EVALUATION & POL’Y ANALYSIS 333, 336 (1985); Dale L. Johnson & Todd
Walker, A Follow-Up Evaluation of the Houston Parent Child Development
Center: School Performance, 15 J. EARLY INTERVENTION 226, 226–27 (1991);
Vonnie McLoyd, The Impact of Economic Hardship on Black Families and
Children: Psychological Distress, Parenting, and Socioemotional Development,
61 CHILD DEV. 311 passim (1990); Samuel J. Meisels & Jack P. Shonkoff, Early Childhood Intervention: A Continuing Evolution, in HANDBOOK OF EARLY
CHILDHOOD INTERVENTION, supra note 239, at 3, 3–4; Milagros Nores et al.,
Updating the Economic Impacts of the High/Scope Perry Preschool Program,
27 EDUC. EVALUATION & POL’Y ANALYSIS 245, 247–52 (2005); Victoria Seitz et
al., Effects of Family Support Intervention: A Ten-Year Follow-Up, 56 CHILD
DEV. 376, 387 (1985).
249. See BLUSTEIN, supra note 47, at 10 (justifying parental rights by reference to children’s interest in a form of upbringing that furthers their growth
to autonomy); Burt, supra note 99, at 127 (“A presumption favoring parents
corresponds both to the social reality that state child rearing interventions are
inherently difficult enterprises and to the psychological reality that an intensely intimate bonding between parent and child lays the best developmental foundation for this society’s most prized personality attributes.”).
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right to a relationship with nonparental caregivers no matter
how central these relationships might be to children’s caregiving experience. The Supreme Court has made it clear that
children’s rights in these contexts, if any even exist, are “at
best” “the obverse” of the parents’ rights.250 The proposition
that children have an independent constitutionally protected
right to maintain primary caregiving relationships has never
been openly accepted by a majority of the Supreme Court.251
The pivotal case addressing nonparental caregiving is
Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality and
Reform.252 While the Court held in that case that the foster
parents did not have a protected liberty interest in a relationship with their foster children, the majority discussed at length
the fact that unrelated individuals may develop emotional ties
with children as significant as those established by parents.253
The Court stressed that protection for parental rights stems in
part “from the emotional attachments that derive from the intimacy of daily association.”254 And in a somewhat ambiguous
passage, the Court intimated that, in the right circumstances,
such relationships might rise to the level of a fundamental interest:
No one would seriously dispute that a deeply loving and interdependent relationship between an adult and a child in his or her care may
exist even in the absence of blood relationship. At least where a child
has been placed in foster care as an infant, has never known his natural parents, and has remained continuously for several years in the
care of the same foster parents, it is natural that the foster family
should hold the same place in the emotional life of the foster child,
and fulfill the same socializing functions, as a natural family.255

The Court went on to state that the interest of foster parents must be weighed against “the natural parent’s constitutionally-recognized fundamental right.”256 Apparently not
raised before the Supreme Court was the question of the children’s independent right to maintain caregiving relationship
with their foster parents. Had the Court weighed the parental
rights against the children’s rights, rather than against the fos250. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 131 (1989).
251. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65–66 (2000) (holding that constitutional caregiving rights are held by parents).
252. 431 U.S. 816 (1977).
253. Id. at 833–44.
254. Id. at 844.
255. Id. (footnotes omitted).
256. Id. at 846–47.
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ter parents’ interests, a different decision might have been
reached.
Over the years, dissenting voices on the Supreme Court
have been heard emphasizing children’s constitutional interest
in nonparental caregiving. Justices Stewart and Stevens have
been the most vocal. In Caban v. Mohammed,257 for example,
Justice Stewart argued in dissent that parental rights do not
inhere solely in “the biological connection between parent and
child.”258 Instead, as Justice Stewart phrased it, “[t]hey require
relationships more enduring.”259 More recently, Justice Stevens
picked up on the same theme in his own dissent in Troxel v.
Granville, a case involving grandparents petitioning for the
right to visit their grandchildren over the objections of the
mother. He began with the proposition that, in any dispute between parents and third parties, there exists also “the child’s
own complementary interest in preserving relationships that
serve her welfare and protection.”260 He elaborated: “A parent’s
rights with respect to her child have thus never been regarded
as absolute, but rather are limited by the existence of an actual, developed relationship with a child, and are tied to the
presence or absence of some embodiment of family.”261 Justice
Stevens did not go so far as to argue that children’s rights to
maintain caregiving relationships are on a par with parental
rights, but he did reject the absolutism of parental rights in
light of the “serious harm” caused by the termination of nonparental family relationships.262
The developmental theory expands upon Justice Stevens’s
observations about caregiving harm by recognizing children’s
constitutional right to maintain caregiving relationships with
their primary caregivers, whether parents or third parties. This
developmental approach to maintaining caregiving relationships has close ties to the psychological parent theory espoused
257. 441 U.S. 380, 382 (1979) (holding as unconstitutional under the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment the statute that gave preference to the mother of a child born out of wedlock over the father in a custody
petition).
258. Id. at 397 (Stewart, J., dissenting). In these unwed-father cases, the
presence of a quasi-marital relationship with the biological mother seemed to
serve as a proxy for the father’s caregiving relationship with the child. See
Dailey, supra note 50, at 489.
259. Caban, 441 U.S. at 397 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
260. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 88 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
261. Id.
262. Id. at 90.
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by Joseph Goldstein, Anna Freud, and Albert Solnit in a series
of books beginning in 1973.263 In these books, the authors argued that custody should always be awarded to the person with
whom the child has the strongest emotional bond whether or
not that person is the child’s legal parent. The psychological
parent theory was never fully accepted by the courts in large
part because the authors insisted that caregiving rights should
be exclusive. Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit’s focus on exclusive
caregiving relationships did not seem to leave much room for
joint custody or blended families, nor for visitation over the objection of the custodial parent. While the psychological parent
theory arguably went too far in the direction of caregiving exclusivity, the theory rightly focused on the adverse developmental consequences following serious disruptions in the primary caregiving relationship.264
The developmental theory does not override the doctrine of
parental rights. Instead, it proposes that a constitutional balance must be reached when conflict exists between parents and
their children over the role of nonparental caregivers. In these
situations, parental rights must be weighed against the child’s
right to maintain a primary caregiving relationship, whether
custodial or not, with the nonparental figure in his or her life.
Recognizing children’s due process right to maintain nonparental caregiving relationships means that courts will often be required to balance the various interests on a case-by-case basis.
Bright-line rules are necessarily sacrificed but the fundamental
nature of children’s interests at stake justifies particularized
inquiry. In most cases, courts will already be involved in custody disputes or removal proceedings, so the procedures for balancing parental and children’s rights will already be underway.
Moreover, over time, courts can develop a set of factors to be
taken into account in assessing the strength of the caregiverchild bond and the importance of the caregiving relationship to
the child’s developmental needs.265
From a developmental perspective, the Court in Troxel266
should have considered the children’s right to maintain rela263. See sources cited supra note 221; see also ALSTOTT, NO EXIT, supra
note 194, at 16–20.
264. See ALSTOTT, NO EXIT, supra note 194, at 17 (“I begin with Goldstein,
Freud and Solnit because their theory has become a classic in the academy
and in the legal world, and because it explains, in an accessible and compact
fashion, the developmental importance to children of continuity of care.”).
265. See Dailey, supra note 50, at 493.
266. 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
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tionships with the primary caregivers in their lives. In this
case, a majority of the Court agreed that a Washington trial
court decision granting visitation rights to grandparents
against the wishes of the mother violated the mother’s right to
raise her children. In a plurality opinion, Justice O’Connor established a standard that the states may not intrude upon the
decisionmaking authority of fit parents.267 As noted above, Justice Stevens in his dissent took a more developmental approach
in finding that “[t]here is at a minimum a third individual,
whose interests are implicated in every case to which the statute applies—the child.”268 From a developmental perspective,
the standard in these circumstances should be whether the
nonparental caregiving relationship rises to the level of a primary relationship in the child’s life. Under this standard, the
decision in Troxel as it pertained to the facts of that case may
have been correct as there was no evidence in the Supreme
Court’s opinion that the grandparents were primary caregivers
in the children’s lives. However, a developmental approach
would make explicit that children have an independent right to
maintain a relationship with their primary caregivers, whether
legal parents or not.
Children also experience caregiving harm when the state
intervenes to remove children from their parents on grounds of
parental abuse or neglect. In these circumstances, parents and
children have a shared interest in maintaining these caregiving
bonds.269 In Santosky v. Kramer, the Supreme Court held that
the state must show by clear and convincing evidence that the
parents are unfit before parental rights can be terminated.270
The Court justified this heightened evidentiary standard in
part on the ground that “the child and his parents share a vital
interest in preventing erroneous termination of their natural
relationship.”271 While the Court did not focus specifically on
caregiving harm, it did note that “[e]ven when a child’s natural
home is imperfect, permanent removal from that home will not
necessarily improve his welfare.”272 The decision illustrates
267. Id. at 68–69.
268. Id. at 86 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
269. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 passim (1982).
270. Id. at 748–49.
271. Id. at 760.
272. Id. at 765 n.15 (citing Michael Wald, State Intervention on Behalf of
“Neglected” Children: A Search for Realistic Standards, 27 STAN. L. REV. 985,
993 (1975)). The dissent in Santosky downplayed the potentially harmful effects of removal, but did focus on the child’s independent interest in “[a] stable,
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that parental rights can sometimes serve as a proxy for protecting children’s independent interest in maintaining a relationship with their primary caregivers. But where a child’s primary
caregiving relationship is with someone other than the legal
parents, then the interests of the parents and the child are no
longer aligned, and parental rights must be balanced against
the child’s independent developmental right to maintain a relationship with that third party.
In related circumstances, children’s independent right to
maintain a primary caregiving relationship with their parents
also comes into play when noncitizen parents of citizen children
are deported. All circuit courts to address this issue have concluded that removal orders against a noncitizen parent do not
violate the constitutional rights of the citizen child.273 The recognition of children’s constitutional right to maintain a caregiving relationship might in some circumstances prevent the state
from deporting noncitizens parents when to do so would require
separation of the parent and child.274 Separation might be necessary, for example, when there is a threat to the child’s safety
or extreme hardship if the child accompanies the parent to the
home country.275 The immigration cases demonstrate that parental rights alone do not suffice to protect children’s caregiving interests because parents and children seeking to preserve
their relationship are not always similarly situated with respect to the threatened caregiving harm.
Children’s right to maintain caregiving relationships also
deserves special recognition in cases arising under other constitutional provisions but touching upon family relationships. Any
case that pits parents against the state has a potential impact
on the parent-child relationship. For example, the Court in
loving home life,” specifically identifying the child’s future interest in adult
citizenship: “Few could doubt that the most valuable resource of a selfgoverning society is its population of children who will one day become adults
and themselves assume the responsibility of self-governance . . . .” Id. at 788–
90 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
273. See, e.g., Payne-Barahona v. Gonzalez, 474 F.3d 1, 2 & n.1 (1st Cir.
2007). See generally Satya Grace Kaskade, Mothers Without Borders: Undocumented Immigrant Mothers Facing Deportation and the Best Interests of
Their U.S. Citizen Children, 15 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 447 (2009) (detailing the high burden mothers facing deportation must meet when pleading
the best interests of their children).
274. See, e.g., Kaskade, supra note 273, at 450.
275. See Niang v. Gonzalez, 492 F.3d 505, 507–08 (4th Cir. 2007) (describing the harm the daughter would suffer from being subjected to female genital
mutilation in the mother’s home country if deported).
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Wisconsin v. Yoder held that the Amish parents in that case
had a First Amendment right to refuse to send their children to
school after the eighth grade.276 The Court rested its decision
on the free exercise rights of parents, but at stake in the case
was also the children’s interest in maintaining caregiving ties
with their custodial parents.277 Justice Douglas’s dissent took
the classic choice theory approach that the children should
have been given the right to make the decision whether to attend school for themselves.278 Missing from any of the opinions
in Yoder was a developmental perspective that would have taken into account the potential impact of the state’s compulsory
education law on the children’s primary caregiving relationships. Cases brought by parents challenging school curriculum
on First Amendment grounds also raise usually unexamined
issues concerning the effect of curriculum requirements on the
parent-child relationship.279 Robert Burt has argued that the
school policy in Tinker, which forbade the wearing of black
armbands in school, potentially adversely affected the parents’
relationship to their children.280 In all these cases, the child’s
underlying interest in maintaining caregiving relationships
comes into play when assessing the constitutionality of the governmental action. The harm to caregiving would not necessarily
lead to strict scrutiny in all cases. The level of scrutiny should
turn on the nature and degree of the children’s caregiving interest in the circumstances of the particular case.
In some cases, primary caregivers themselves should have
standing to assert children’s rights and interests, particularly
where the parent is the sole caregiver in the child’s life. The
standing issue would arise most frequently when state action
threatens to separate parent and child for an extended period
of time. For example, when primary caregivers are sentenced to
jail, the courts do not usually consider the impact on children’s
caregiving interests. Similarly, unwanted deployment overseas
276. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 207 (1972).
277. Id. at 214.
278. Id. at 241–43 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
279. See, e.g., Mozert v. Hawkins Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058, 1070
(6th Cir. 1987) (holding that requiring public school students to study basic
materials chosen by school authorities did not create an unconstitutional burden under the Free Exercise of Religion Clause of the First Amendment).
280. See Burt, supra note 99, at 124 (noting that the Tinker court failed to
“acknowledge the potential educational and constitutional relevance of the
facts in the case suggesting that the children’s armbands reflected more their
parents’ convictions than theirs”).

2168

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[95:2099

of primary caregivers can have serious consequences for the
children of single parents. The issue of parental removal in the
immigration context has already been discussed. The analysis
here is not so different from the constitutional analysis relating
to children’s fundamental interest in education. Anytime the
state acts to separate primary caregivers from their children,
the court should apply heightened scrutiny of the state action
based on the harm to children’s caregiving rights.
Finally, the developmental theory opens the door to establishing children’s affirmative right to a minimum level of caregiving services from the state. Much has been written on the
obstacles to a theory of affirmative constitutional rights. As
Goodwin Liu has recently observed, “[T]he idea that our Constitution guarantees affirmative rights to social and economic
welfare has for some time been out of fashion.”281 Robin West
has similarly noted that rights theorists have concluded “that
rights, as conceived and employed in at least United States liberal and constitutional jurisprudence, are fundamentally at
odds with any purported state obligation to ensure the material
preconditions of a good society.”282 Apart from Liu and West,
281. Goodwin Liu, Rethinking Constitutional Welfare Rights, 61 STAN. L.
REV. 203, 204 (2008).
282. Robin West, Rights, Capabilities, and the Good Society, 69 FORDHAM
L. REV. 1901, 1907 (2001). Frank Michelman wrote the seminal work on the
rights of poor citizens to basic necessities. Frank I. Michelman, Foreword: On
Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7
(1969). William Forbath also describes a “social citizenship tradition” in American law that he argues supports affirmative constitutional welfare rights.
William E. Forbath, Constitutional Welfare Rights: A History, Critique and
Reconstruction, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1821, 1827–28 (2001). But see Robert H.
Bork, The Impossibility of Finding Welfare Rights in the Constitution, 1979
WASH. U. L.Q. 695, 695–96; Henry Paul Monaghan, The Constitution Goes to
Harvard, 13 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 117, 118 (1978).
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the Supreme Court appeared to be moving in the direction of recognizing affirmative rights to certain basic welfare
goods. See Cass R. Sunstein, Why Does the American Constitution Lack Social
and Economic Guarantees? (Univ. of Chi., Public Law Working Paper No. 36,
2003), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=375622. At that time, the Court
used language suggesting that there was a fundamental right to “the very
means to subsist—food, shelter, and other necessities of life.” Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 627 (1969); see also Mem’l Hosp. v. Maricopa Cnty.,
415 U.S. 250, 261–62 (1974) (nonemergency medical care); U.S. Dep’t of Agric.
v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508, 514 (1973) (food stamps); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S.
254, 264 (1970) (pretermination evidentiary hearings). But the Supreme Court
soon made clear that in the United States adults do not have affirmative constitutional rights to basic social necessities. See Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464,
469–71 (1977) (nontherapeutic abortions); San Antonio Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez,
411 U.S. 1, 55 (1973) (public school financing); Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56,

2011]

CHILDREN’S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS

2169

there are few contemporary scholars calling for the recognition
of affirmative rights as an essential feature of the present constitutional scheme.283 The Supreme Court has recognized some
affirmative constitutional rights, most in the realm of procedure such as the right to a speedy trial or to habeas corpus, but
for the most part the Constitution is treated as a charter of
negative liberties.284
A developmental theory of children’s rights rejects the prevailing view of affirmative constitutional rights as they pertain
to children. A constitutional regime of negative liberty for
adults does not preclude recognition of affirmative rights for
children.285 The most important recent case addressing the
question of affirmative constitutional rights involved a claim
for protection from physical harm brought by a child and his
mother. In that case, DeShaney v. Winnebago County,286 the
child and his mother argued that state authorities had failed to
protect the boy from abuse at the hands of his father. In rejecting the claim, the Court observed that “the Due Process Clauses generally confer no affirmative right to governmental aid,
even where such aid may be necessary to secure life, liberty, or
property interests of which the government itself may not deprive the individual.”287 The majority recognized an exception
74 (1972) (housing); James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137, 142–43 (1971) (public
housing); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 486–87 (1970) (Aid to Families
With Dependent Children program).
283. See Goodwin Liu, Education, Equality, and National Citizenship, 116
YALE L.J. 330, 337 (2006) (“Neither the text nor the history of the Constitution
forecloses a reading of its broad guarantees to encompass positive rights, and
the experiences of other nations suggest that the existence of such rights is
compatible with constitutionalism.”); West, supra note 282, at 1907 (“The notion of a positive right may be disfavored in contemporary liberal discourse,
but it is by no means oxymoronic.”); cf. Ezer, supra note 184, at 3 (arguing for
“a positive right to protection for children”); Forbath, supra note 282, at 1888
(“[A] republican constitution must vouchsafe the social conditions of democratic lawmaking . . . .”); Ryan, supra note 222, at 53 (proposing an affirmative
right to preschool at the state constitutional level).
284. Some commentators have observed that certain negative rights recognized under the Constitution require a set of background entitlements that
might be construed as affirmative rights. See, e.g., Liu, supra note 283, at 336–
37 (citing David P. Currie, Positive and Negative Constitutional Rights, 53 U.
CHI. L. REV. 864, 886 (1986)); Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner’s Legacy, 87 COLUM.
L. REV. 873, 889 (1987)).
285. See Ezer, supra note 184, at 2 (“Although children defy the conventional view of negative rights, they lend themselves more readily to a positive
rights regime.”).
286. 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
287. Id. at 196.
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to this general rule where “the State takes a person into its
custody and holds him there against his will.”288 But the holding in DeShaney clearly stands for the proposition that children
not in the direct custody of the state have no special claim to
minimum affirmative constitutional entitlements to their own
safety.
What the Court missed in DeShaney is the fact that affirmative rights for children are necessary in some circumstances
for children to acquire the very skills of autonomous choice that
the Court in DeShaney seeks to protect. It is not that children
have an absolute right not to be harmed. Rather, from a developmental perspective, children have a right to the minimum
level of caregiving services necessary to ensure their physical
safety. In DeShaney, it may in fact have been the case that the
State of Wisconsin had adequate services available, and that
the harm to the child resulted from unforeseeable errors. Clearly, not every caregiving harm can become a cognizable constitutional offense. But the question of whether the State of Wisconsin’s child welfare system provided in general a constitutionally
adequate level of services was never considered.289
The possibility of affirmative rights unique to children has
not entirely escaped the attention of the Supreme Court. The
right to custody is the prime example. In Gault, the Supreme
Court described children’s fundamental right to custody as follows:
The right of the state, as parens patriae, to deny to the child procedural rights available to his elders was elaborated by the assertion
that a child, unlike an adult, has a right “not to liberty but to custody.” He can be made to attorn to his parents, to go to school, etc. If his
parents default in effectively performing their custodial functions—
that is, if the child is “delinquent”—the state may intervene. In doing
so, it does not deprive the child of any rights, because he has none. It
merely provides the “custody” to which the child is entitled.290

Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority in the 1984
case of Schall v. Martin, endorsed the “right to custody” argument.291 In upholding the practice of juvenile pretrial detention, he wrote:

288. Id. at 199–200.
289. Many commentators have criticized the Court’s affirmative rights
holding in DeShaney. See, e.g., Susan Bandes, The Negative Constitution: A
Critique, 88 MICH. L. REV. 2271, 2278–97 (1990).
290. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 17 (1967) (citation omitted).
291. Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 265 (1984).
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The juvenile’s countervailing interest in freedom from institutional
restraints . . . is undoubtedly substantial. . . . [T]hat interest must be
qualified by the recognition that juveniles, unlike adults, are always
in some form of custody . . . . Children, by definition, are not assumed
to have the capacity to take care of themselves. They are assumed to
be subject to the control of their parents, and if parental control falters, the State must play its part . . . .292

As the passage from Schall indicates, one of the ironies of
this particular justification for the dependency thesis—that
children have a right to custody instead of liberty—is that it
provides a basis for arguing that children have an affirmative
right to the custodial environments they need. One commentator quoted by the Supreme Court in Gault elaborated, “The basic right of a juvenile is not to liberty but to custody. He has the
right to have someone take care of him, and if his parents do
not afford him this custodial privilege, the law must do so.”293
Justice Rehnquist echoes this point when he notes that the
state “must” take custody of a child when parents are unfit.294
Schall’s right to custody provides the starting point for establishing that the Constitution confers minimum affirmative
rights on children. Children’s developmental right to education
is a familiar idea.295 Because the prevailing model of children’s
upbringing emphasizes the importance of education to the cultivation of critical-thinking skills, it has long supported calls for
educational rights. In a pair of cases from the 1940s, the Supreme Court first affirmed the state’s educational mission of
“educating the young for citizenship,”296 and a decade later
Brown sounded that same theme.297 Children’s fundamental interest in education has been highlighted in cases brought by
children against school authorities under many constitutional
provisions, including the First Amendment, the Due Process
292. Id. (citation omitted).
293. Curtis C. Shears, Legal Problems Peculiar to Children’s Courts, 48
A.B.A. J. 719, 720 (1962) (quoted in In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 17 n.21).
294. See Schall, 467 U.S. at 265.
295. See, e.g., Gutmann, supra note 176, at 349; Haydon, supra note 176, at 5.
296. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943).
297. In Brown, the Court emphasized that education is a prerequisite to
citizenship in a democratic republic:
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and
local governments. Compulsory school attendance laws and the great
expenditures for education both demonstrate our recognition of the
importance of education to our democratic society. It is required in
the performance of our most basic public responsibilities, even service
in the armed forces. It is the very foundation of good citizenship.
347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
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Clause, and the Equal Protection Clause.298 Although the Supreme Court has never expressly recognized a fundamental
right to public education under the Federal Constitution, the
Court has affirmed that public education is not “some governmental ‘benefit’ indistinguishable from other forms of social
welfare legislation.”299 Even San Antonio Independent School
District v. Rodriguez, known for holding that the Constitution
does not protect the right to education, nevertheless opens the
door to recognizing an affirmative right to education where not
even minimum school services are available.300 The role of education in socializing children for adult responsibilities played a
central role in the Supreme Court’s decision in Plyler v. Doe,
which upheld the right of undocumented alien children to attend public school.301
The developmental theory corrects for the prevailing education-centered view of affirmative rights by focusing on children’s equally important rights to caregiving. While education
is certainly a central developmental right, the prevailing and
singular focus on education as the place where children’s citizenship skills are developed misses the foundational role of
caregiving in the development of autonomous choice, and the
important way in which caregiving sets the stage for all later
educational experiences. The remainder of this section outlines
what an affirmative constitutional right to caregiving would
look like.
An affirmative right to caregiving services means that
children at risk of caregiving failure would have a claim under
the Due Process Clause to state services supporting family
caregiving. From a developmental perspective, childhood poverty presents the most compelling case for recognizing children’s
affirmative rights to minimum necessities because it poses the
most substantial risk to the establishment of a good-enough

298. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 9.
299. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221 (1982).
300. Compare San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35
(1973) (“Education, of course, is not among the rights afforded explicit protection under our Federal Constitution. Nor do we find any basis for saying it is
implicitly so protected.”), with id. at 23 (noting that Rodriguez did not involve
an “absolute deprivation” of education benefits).
301. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 222 n.20. The right to education is guaranteed in
all state constitutions, and more than one-half of those states guarantee children a qualitative right to equal or adequate education. See Ryan, supra note
222, at 52.
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caregiving environment for the greatest number of children.302
Childhood poverty adversely affects the early caregiving relationship in part because it coexists with so many other unfavorable risk factors for caregiving failure such as homelessness,
substance abuse, unemployment, and neighborhood violence.303
Research shows that positive parental involvement in children’s lives can be a mediating factor between child poverty
and child outcomes.304 However, caregiver depression and anger stemming from poverty are a common and normal facet of
life, as well as a significant strain on the caregiving relationship.305 Abuse and neglect occur at higher rates in families
struggling under the strain of poverty.306 Poverty correlates
with single parenthood and broken families, situations that
present the greatest challenges to successful caregiving. Given

302. Cf. DEANNA M. LYTER ET AL., INST. FOR WOMEN’S POLICY RESEARCH,
THE CHILDREN LEFT BEHIND 39 tbl.1 (2003) (highlighting the number of children in poverty). In 2008, nineteen percent of children were living below the
poverty line. See VANESSA R. WIGHT ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR CHILDREN IN
POVERTY, WHO ARE AMERICA’S POOR CHILDREN? 3 (2010), available at http://
www.nccp.org/publications/pdf/text_912.pdf. Forty-six percent of children under
age three live in low-income families, MICHELLE CHAU ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR
CHILDREN IN POVERTY, BASIC FACTS ABOUT LOW-INCOME CHILDREN, 2009:
CHILDREN UNDER AGE 3, at 1 (2010), available at http://www.nccp.org/
publications/pdf/text_971.pdf, and twenty-four percent of children under age
six live below the poverty line, MICHELLE CHAU ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR
CHILDREN IN POVERTY, BASIC FACTS ABOUT LOW-INCOME CHILDREN, 2009:
CHILDREN UNDER AGE 6, at 1 (2010), available at http://www.nccp.org/
publications/pdf/text_972.pdf. Even after controlling for other variables such
as family structure, parental welfare, parental schooling, parental work, and
neighborhood poverty, children raised in long-term poverty experienced higher
rates of poverty as adults than did nonpoor children. See Mary E. Corcoran &
Ajay Chaudry, The Dynamics of Childhood Poverty, 7 FUTURE CHILD., no. 2,
1997 at 40, 51 tbl.2.
303. See Jeanne Brooks-Gunn et al., Toward an Understanding of the Effects of Poverty upon Children, in CHILDREN OF POVERTY 3, 17–20 (Hiram E.
Fitzgerald et al. eds., 1995); Arnold J. Sameroff, Models of Development and
Developmental Risk, in HANDBOOK OF INFANT MENTAL HEALTH 3, 9 (Charles
H. Zeenah, Jr. ed., 1993).
304. See Kerry E. Bolger et al., Psychosocial Adjustment Among Children
Experiencing Persistent and Intermittent Family Economic Hardship, 66
CHILD DEV. 1107, 1108 (1995).
305. See Vonnie McLoyd, Poverty, Parenting, and Policy: Meeting the Support Needs of Poor Parents, in CHILDREN OF POVERTY, supra note 303, at 269,
273; Vonnie C. McLoyd, Socioeconomic Disadvantage and Child Development,
53 AM. PSYCHOL. 185, 196 (1998); Vonnie C. McLoyd & Leon Wilson, The
Strain of Living Poor: Parenting, Social Support, and Child Mental Health, in
CHILDREN IN POVERTY 105, 108 (Aletha C. Huston ed., 1991).
306. See McLoyd, supra note 248, at 324 –25.
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the demographics of poverty, its impact is greatest on children
of color.307
The deleterious effect of poverty on early caregiving is supported by the social science research. Research shows that early caregiving intervention has significant long-term beneficial
effects on children living in poverty.308 For example, extensive
research has been done showing that enrollment in high quality day care correlates with greater child interest and task
orientation and lower child anxiety.309 Children attending high
quality daycare also exhibit relatively fewer unfriendly interactions with their peers, better impulse control, and greater social
competency.310 Socialization is the primary area in which studies have demonstrated long-term psychological effects of quality
day care. Multiple studies have found that in comparison with
control groups, students enrolled in child care as toddlers exhibited better school attendance and classroom behavior up to ten
years later.311 Studies also consistently show that quality daycare can improve a child’s later scholastic performance.312 The
307. See Bolger et al., supra note 304, at 1109; McLoyd, supra note 248, at 311.
308. See, e.g., W. Steven Barnett, Long-Term Effects of Early Childhood
Programs on Cognitive and School Outcomes, 5 FUTURE CHILD, no. 3, 1995 at
25, 43–44; Halbert B. Robinson & Nancy M. Robinson, Longitudinal Development of Very Young Children in a Comprehensive Day Care Program: The First
Two Years, 42 CHILD DEV. 1673, 1681–82 (1971). In this regard:
Research . . . strongly suggests that good day care can promote children’s cognitive and social development. Children in better day-care
centers score higher on standardized language and intelligence tests.
They demonstrate more task orientation; a higher level of play with
objects, adults, and peers; more sociability and consideration; more
compliance and self-regulation; higher communicativeness and reciprocity with their mothers; and a more positive attitude toward
adults.
Donna King & Carol E. MacKinnon, Making Difficult Choices Easier: A Review
of Research on Day Care and Children’s Development, 37 FAM. REL. 392, 394
(1988) (citations omitted).
309. DEBORAH LOWE VANDELL & BARBARA WOLFE, INST. FOR RESEARCH ON
POVERTY, CHILD CARE QUALITY passim (2000), available at http://aspe.hhs
.gov/hsp/ccquality00/ccqual.htm.
310. Deborah Lowe Vandell, A Longitudinal Study of Children with DayCare Experiences of Varying Quality, 59 CHILD DEV. 1286, 1290–92 (1988).
311. See Johnson & Walker, supra note 248, at 233–35; Seitz et al., supra
note 248, at 387.
312. Outcomes of quality day care include various achievements. See, e.g.,
ELLEN S. PEISNER-FEINBERG & NOREEN YAZEJIAN, FPG CHILD DEV. INST., THE
RELATION OF PRESCHOOL CHILD CARE QUALITY TO CHILDREN’S LONGITUDINAL
SCHOOL SUCCESS THROUGH SIXTH GRADE 7 (2004), available at http://www
.researchconnections.org/files/meetings/ccprc/2004 -04/posters/peisneryazejian
.pdf (fewer negative narrative comments in a child’s elementary school
records); Anders G. Broberg et al., Effects of Day Care on the Development of
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benefits are most pronounced for children who enter daycare
early on, before one year of age.313
The research on the beneficial effects of high quality daycare on at-risk children suggests that improvements in early
caregiving have significant and long-term effects on children’s
development in a wide range of areas. Notably, the positive effects of quality daycare for poor children are not limited to
childhood outcomes but rather include longer-term life impacts.
Perhaps the most famous and commonly referenced example of
a program producing substantial long-term effects is the Michigan Perry Preschool program of the 1960s.314 Longitudinal studies of three- and four-year-olds who attended the program
found that participants demonstrated lower lifetime criminal
activity, higher educational attainment, and eleven percent to
nineteen percent higher earnings between the ages of eighteen
and forty as compared to control-group children.315 Early intervention in the lives of poor children likely has positive effects in
part because the intervention supports and improves existing
Cognitive Abilities in 8-Year-Olds: A Longitudinal Study, 33 DEV. PSYCHOL.
62, 67 (1997) (better standardized achievement test scores); Linda Jacobson,
Child-Care Effects Seen into 3rd Grade, EDUC. WK., May 4, 2005, at 9 (same);
id. (better memory skills).
313. Bengt-Erik Andersson, Effects of Public Day-Care: A Longitudinal
Study, 60 CHILD DEV. 857, 864 (1989). Like day care, early childhood educational programs also show significant benefits for children. In the short term,
quality preschool programs boost children’s IQ, though these effects tend to
fade while children are still in elementary school. See Ryan, supra note 222, at
59–63; see also CYNTHIA LAMY ET AL., NAT’L INST. FOR EARLY EDUC.
RESEARCH, THE EFFECTS OF NEW JERSEY’S ABBOTT PRESCHOOL PROGRAM ON
YOUNG CHILDREN’S SCHOOL READINESS 3 (2005), available at http://nieer.org/
resources/research/multistate/nj.pdf. However, these programs also lead to
longer-lasting and sizeable gains in achievement scores, especially in reading,
see Ryan, supra note 222, at 63, and lower rates of entry into special education, see Liza M. Conyers et al., The Effect of Early Childhood Intervention and
Subsequent Special Education Services: Findings from the Chicago ChildParent Centers, 25 EDUC. EVALUATION & POL’Y ANALYSIS 75, 77 (2003). Studies based on students’ self-reported data at the age of fifteen have found that
former participants of quality early education programs place a higher value
on schooling than do their nonprogram counterparts. B. Zoritch et al., The
Health and Welfare Effects of Day-Care: A Systematic Review of Randomized
Controlled Trials, 47 SOC. SCI. MED. 317, 322 (1998).
314. See, e.g., LEONARD N. MASSE & W. STEVEN BARNETT, NAT’L INST. FOR
EARLY EDUC. RESEARCH, A BENEFIT COST ANALYSIS OF THE ABECEDARIAN
EARLY CHILDHOOD INTERVENTION 5 (2002), available at http://nieer.org/
resources/research/AbecedarianStudy.pdf.
315. See Barnett, supra note 248, at 336; Nores et al., supra note 248, at
247–52. Other long-term advantages of program participation included lower
rates of drug use, lower rates of teenage pregnancy, and lower rates of mortality. See id.
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caregiving relationships. This research on early intervention
supports the developmental literature showing the strong connections among childhood poverty, high quality early caregiving, and children’s psychological development.
Children’s affirmative constitutional right to caregiving
services does not mean that caregiving must be perfect, or even
necessarily good. The standard for caregiving services need only reach as high as the minimal standard of “good-enough”
caregiving, by which is meant the services must offer the child
the possibility of establishing and maintaining a responsive, affectively attuned, stable caregiving relationship. The concept of
good-enough caregiving sets the parameters for what children
on average need, and provides a measure for evaluating the environmental stresses that adversely affect early caregiving.
Services providing poor children with basic necessities such as
income support, food, housing, and clothing certainly qualify as
necessary under this standard. Although investigation of what
services beyond basic necessities are constitutionally compelled
must await further work, a standard of good-enough caregiving
might eventually support poor children’s entitlement to early
childcare services such as visiting nurses, daycare, and preschool.316
While affirmative rights to caregiving services anticipate
substantial reallocation of social resources, federal and state
laws already currently include scores of programs benefiting
poor children.317 The developmental approach to children’s
rights thus reflects and builds on this existing social welfare
system. Although a developmental model that recognizes children’s constitutional rights to caregiving may seem radical in
its goal of reducing the worst effects of childhood poverty, this
316. See Jeanne Brooks-Gunn, Strategies for Altering the Outcomes of Poor
Children and Their Families, in ESCAPE FROM POVERTY 87, 96 (P. Lindsay
Chase-Lansdale & Jeanne Brooks-Gunn eds., 1995); Barbara L. Devaney et
al., Programs That Mitigate the Effects of Poverty on Children, 7 FUTURE
CHILD., no. 2, 1997 at 88, 91 tbl.1; Aletha C. Huston, Antecedents, Consequences, and Possible Solutions for Poverty Among Children, in CHILDREN IN
POVERTY, supra note 303, at 282, 312; David L. Olds et al., Prenatal and Infancy Home Visitation by Nurses: Recent Findings, 9 FUTURE CHILD., no. 1,
1999 at 44, 61–62.
317. See, e.g., INST. FOR EDUC. LEADERSHIP, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
SPECIAL REPORT no. 15, FEDERAL PROGRAMS FOR CHILDREN & FAMILIES 7
(2000), available at http://www.iel.org/pubs/fedprogs.pdf; Compilation of Selected Federal Programs for Children and Families, WOMEN’S & CHILDREN’S
HEALTH POLICY CTR., http://www.jhsph.edu/wchpc/resources/federal_MCH.html
(last visited Apr. 28, 2011).
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goal in fact is already deeply embedded in existing entitlement
programs and services directed to children’s well-being. Indeed,
children’s right to caregiving services only advances existing
social commitments to eliminating the most harmful effects of
child poverty. Ultimately, it is to be hoped that this substantial
investment in children’s upbringing will bring, as research indicates it will, long-term economic benefits of its own.318
A final issue regarding the justiciability of children’s
claims to caregiving services presents itself. Children’s affirmative constitutional rights raise the question whether children’s
developmental rights to caregiving services are judicially enforceable or whether, instead, these constitutional rights are
only enforceable through the political branches. That the federal and state legislatures carry the primary responsibility for
ensuring that children’s affirmative caregiving rights are fulfilled makes sense for a number of reasons, as Liu and West
have both explained in recent work on the subject of affirmative
constitutional rights generally.319 Congress and the state legislatures are the only governmental bodies directly empowered to
provide the kind of caregiving services required. Any judicial
remedy in this area must be directed to executive officials who
in turn must look to the legislature for policy guidance and appropriations. Legislatures are also best situated to consider all
the policy implications relating to proposed programs for children and how they fit with existing child welfare and educational services at both the national and state levels. Congressional action need not take the form of providing direct
governmental services to children, but can include spending initiatives that support the states’ activities in these areas. Yet
the importance of the constitutional rights at stake demands a
minimal degree of judicial intervention, at least in the initial
stages to ensure that children’s rights become a legislative
priority.320 Once Congress undertakes the task, the federal
courts’ role will be to ensure that good faith efforts to provide
children with minimum levels of caregiving services are being
made. It is not the responsibility of the federal courts to micro318. See Ryan, supra note 222, at 65–67 (discussing the economic benefits
from early intervention programs).
319. See Liu, supra note 281, at 204 –05; Robin West, Unenumerated Duties, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 221, 228–29 (2006). Robin West argues that Congress and not the courts has the moral responsibility to further social welfare
ends, although—contrary to the argument here—she rejects judicial enforcement of these legislative duties. Id.
320. See Sunstein, supra note 282, at 12.
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manage federal and state efforts to implement caregiving programs and services, but some level of judicial oversight on behalf of children is likely to be necessary at the outset.
The developmental theory of caregiving rights is open to
the criticism that its vision for the redistribution of resources is
simply not politically feasible. Two brief responses are worth
making here. First, a theory which reimagines the relationship
of the state to children—particularly children living in poverty—is itself worthwhile to the extent it helps to draw attention
to children’s right to (and need for) caregiving services. Second,
as already noted, federal and state laws already confer a wide
range of benefits on children. A developmental right to caregiving would expand upon these benefits in the same way that the
decision in Brown built upon an educational system already in
existence. While the developmental theory has the potential for
reshaping our social landscape by eliminating the worst effects
of childhood poverty, these long-term consequences of recognizing children’s constitutional rights to caregiving fulfill, rather
than subvert, existing social, constitutional, and political
ideals.
CONCLUSION
This Article has presented a developmental theory of children’s rights that focuses on the fundamental role of children’s
rights in the socialization process leading to adult autonomy.
As explained above, the long history of denying children the full
range of constitutional rights has its roots in a choice theory of
rights. Choice theory understands rights as deriving from the
decisionmaking autonomy of the individual. From the perspective of choice theory, children do not enjoy most constitutional
rights because they lack the capacity for autonomous choice.
Choice theory not only justifies the long history of denying
children rights, but it also serves to explain the recent but
growing number of modern Supreme Court cases in which
children’s constitutional rights have been recognized. Choice
theory regards these newly recognized rights as “autonomy
rights,” that is, adult rights given to older children based on
their increasing capacity for autonomous choice.
As explained in this Article, choice theory falls short as a
theory of children’s constitutional rights for two reasons. First,
as a descriptive matter, choice theory is simply too narrow. As
choice theorists would acknowledge, the theory does not address whole categories of existing rights where the decision-
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making autonomy of the right-holder is not in issue. Even more
troubling, choice theory has no conceptual apparatus for defining children’s rights in terms of children’s future autonomy or
for conceiving of children’s rights in socializing terms. Second,
as a psychology of decisionmaking, choice theory rests on an excessively rationalist model of decisionmaking that ignores numerous core aspects of mature, autonomous choice. Psychological
research on decisionmaking illuminates the broad range of
mental skills—cognitive, emotional, and imaginative—that
children must acquire in order to become autonomous decisionmakers. By associating autonomous choice with criticalthinking skills learned in school, choice theory ignores the noncognitive attributes of choice and the family caregiving essential to their development.
This Article has proposed a developmental theory of children’s constitutional rights that overcomes the descriptive and
psychological limitations of prevailing choice theory while preserving its central commitment to individual autonomy. The
developmental theory’s core insight into the importance of
caregiving to children’s future autonomy supports recognizing
children’s fundamental constitutional rights in the caregiving
relationship. As described in this Article, children’s caregiving
rights take three basic forms. First are children’s rights under
the Due Process Clause to be free from state intervention into
established caregiving relationships. Second are children’s
rights arising under other constitutional provisions where the
rights at issue touch upon their caregiving interests. Third, and
most far-reaching, are children’s affirmative constitutional
rights to a minimum level of caregiving services from the state.
This final category of rights focuses the debate on state support
for the caregiving relationships children need to become autonomous adults and citizens. In elaborating on a developmental
theory of children’s constitutional rights, this Article aims to
secure children’s rightful place as full members and future autonomous participants in the constitutional scheme.

